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ARTICLES
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION-
PROMPTED SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
Bradley W. Joondeph*
I. INTRODUCTION
Basic notions of equity dictate that public school stu-
dents should not receive a lesser education simply because
they live in disadvantaged neighborhoods.1 Indeed, a school
system that consistently and systematically devotes fewer re-
sources to the education of its neediest students contravenes
traditional American values of social mobility and equality of
opportunity.
2
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School of Law; J.D., 1994, Stanford Law School; B.A., 1990, Stanford Univer-
sity. The author is grateful to Andrew Berke, Mark Coyne, Carla Garrett, and
Chris Guthrie for their thoughtful contributions. Special thanks to Professor
Ian Ayres for his guidance, support, and suggestions on earlier drafts of this
article.
1. See, e.g., Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of
Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 341 (1991)
("Even the most conservative and anti-egalitarian person, who argues against
state correction of marketplace inequalities, can scarcely maintain that the
state, without strong justification, can itself create inequalities.") (citing A.B.
ATKINSON, UNEQUAL SHARES: WEALTH IN BRITAIN 79 (1974)).
2. See, e.g., JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 207 (1991) (stating
that America's "official" goal is "a society in which a family's wealth has no
relation to the probability of future educational attainment and the wealth and
station it affords," and that "[b]y this standard, education offered to poor chil-
dren should be at least as good as that which is provided to the children of the
upper-middle class"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 139 (1993)
(contending the Constitution embodies the principle of "rough equality of oppor-
tunity" such that "the life prospects of a child born to one family should not be
radically different from those of another child born elsewhere"); R. CRAIG WOOD
& DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHAL-
LENGES TO STATE AID-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 97 (1993) ("In this nation,
with its living constitution, equality has long been the goal of social and eco-
763
764 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
But while America has long been willing to provide free
primary education to all of its citizens, it has stopped well
short of assuring students an education of equal quality. For
example, until 1954 (and for some time thereafter), most Afri-
can American children in the South attended school in
crowded, underfunded, and dilapidated schoolhouses; local
governments often spent ten times as much per white stu-
dent as black.3
nomic reform. Such a goal envisions children growing to become adults who
share equally in the economic, political, and social power of our great nation.");
Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New
Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 402 (1991) ("Our political my-
thology enshrines the notion of equal rights for individuals and abhors the idea
of hereditary caste that determines economic status and success."); Richard
Briffaut, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV.
773, 783 (1992) ("[E]qual educational opportunity... has long been a powerful
norm in American history and law."); Augustus F. Hawkins, Equity in Educa-
tion, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 565, 565 (1991) ("The concept of equal opportunity is
deeply embedded in our national ethos. We Americans love to be seen as good
sports who guarantee a fair chance for all."). Professor Sunstein further con-
tends that equality of opportunity "was a central theme in the framing" of the
Constitution. SUNSTEIN, supra, at 139-40. "The attack on the monarchical leg-
acy was founded on a belief that human differences were often a product of
differences in opportunities. It followed that differences in opportunities
should be equalized." Id. at 140.
3. See, e.g., JuAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIL RIGHTS
YEARS, 1954-1965 2 (1987) ("In 1930, South Carolina spent ten times as much
on educating each white child as on each black child. Other southern states did
little better-Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama devoted five times
more money to the education of white children than to that of black children.");
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 256-57 (1977) ("In 1945, the South was
spending twice as much to educate each white child as it was per black child. It
was investing four times as much in white school plants, paying white teachers
salaries 30 percent higher, and virtually ignoring the critical logistics of trans-
porting rural Negroes to their schoolhouses."); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A
COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 59 (1989) (explaining that
southern states spent roughly twice as much on each white student's education
as on each black student's education in 1940). In fact, at the inception of public
primary education in the United States in the 1820s and 1830s, the education
of African Americans, both slave and free, was illegal in the South. See
KLUGER, supra, at 28; Denise C. Morgan, What Is Left to Argue in Desegregation
Law?: The Right to Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER J.
99, 102 (1991). After the collapse of Reconstruction in 1877, southern states,
through both legal and extralegal means (such as the Ku Klux Klan), ensured
that schools for African American children remained inferior, if available at all.
Morgan, supra, at 103-04. In Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., the
Supreme Court upheld a Georgia school board's decision to maintain a high
school for white children but not for African Americans. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
The Court held that the state court's decision to deny the plaintiff's injunction
was not, "within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the
State to the plaintiffs and those associated with them of the equal protection of
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Although court-mandated desegregation has eliminated
most of these disparities where they were based intentionally
on race, 4 expenditures per student in America's public
schools still vary widely. Expenditures vary not only from
state to state but also from district to district within each
state (interdistrict disparities).5 The cause of these dispari-
ties is that most public school financing systems in the
United States rely heavily on local ad valorem property tax
revenue.6  Per pupil expenditures in each school district
therefore often mirror the relative wealth of a district's sur-
rounding community; school districts encompassing more val-
uable property generate more property tax revenue than
"property poor" districts and, as a result, can spend substan-
tially more per student.7
The origins of this system for financing primary educa-
tion lie in America's dearly held tradition of local control over
public schools." Local control of public elementary and high
the laws or any of the privileges belonging to them as citizens of the United
States." Id. at 545.
4. See Bernard James & Julie M. Hoffman, Brown in State Hands: State
Policymaking and Educational Equity After Freeman v. Pitts, 20 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 521, 524 ("If one limits the characterization of Brown to the propo-
sition that educational policies based on racial classifications are per se invalid,
this goal has been accomplished.").
5. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 592
(3d ed. 1992) ("In many states the level of spending in one district within a state
is often three or four times that of another district within the state. There are
extremes where the differences are as great as twenty to one or more."); Allan
R. Odden, School Finance and Education Reform: An Overview, in RETHINKING
SCHOOL FINANCE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990's 1, 3 (Allan R. Odden ed., 1992).
6. Odden, supra note 5, at 2-3 (noting that "[i]n most states, local property
tax dollars are a major source of school revenues" and local revenues currently
comprise approximately 44% of total school funding).
7. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 592 (stating that "interdistrict disparities
are principally attributable to disparities in property wealth per pupil"); Odden,
supra note 5, at 3 ("Heavy reliance on local property taxes produces fiscal ineq-
uities because the property tax base is not distributed equally across school
districts.").
8. See Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Op-
tion?, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 447 (1991) (explaining that "[miuch of
the responsibility for actually conducting educational programs has historically
been delegated to local school districts, governed by local boards of education,"
and that "direct local control of education has had a long historical tradition in
the United States"). The advent of the local school board and the district sys-
tem of public elementary and primary education is actually traceable to the
colonial period in America. Id. at 447-48. As public education became more
widespread, the district system "eventually... became universal throughout
the United States." Id. at 448.
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766 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
schools has been a foundational principle of American public
education since its inception in the early 1800s.9 Within this
sphere of control has rested the power of each community to
determine how much of the local public fiscal budget should
be devoted to educating the community's children. 10
9. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 3 (1990) (explaining that until the early 1900s "[sichooling
was a local affair. Basic issues of organization and control-issues that today
would be classified as budgeting, curriculum, personnel, purchasing, accounta-
bility, and the like-tended to be handled by the people closest to each school:
parents, interested citizens, and their elected representatives."); Briffaut, supra
note 2, at 773 (noting that local control "is a basic organizational principle of
American public elementary and secondary education"). Loyalty to the tradi-
tion of local control of public schools has played an important role in the
Supreme Court's primary education jurisprudence. As early as 1899, the Court
stated:
[W]hile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must
be shared by citizens without discrimination against any class on ac-
count of their race, the education of the people in schools maintained
by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the manage-
ment of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear
and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of
the land.
Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). More
recently, the Supreme Court held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), that Texas's interest in preserving local control over educational fund-
ing justified the state's financing scheme, even where it resulted in wide dispar-
ities among districts. See infra text accompanying notes 14-15, 73-83. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of local control in
the context of school desegregation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430,
1445 (1992) ("Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest
practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our govern-
mental system."); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) ("Local
control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in decision-
making, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs.");
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[Our cases have
.. firmly recognized that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition."); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradi-
tion in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the opera-
tion of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to qual-
ity of the education process."). Indeed, the Court has favored the return of more
control to local officials by supervising district courts even when it may aggra-
vate existing racial imbalances. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown
Softly: The Subtle Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts,
46 STAN. L. REv. 147, 161-67 (1993).
10. See Joseph T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in California: The After-
math of Serrano v. Priest and Proposition 13, 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1986). A
partner at a school finance consulting firm recently stated:
The entire debate over public school funding has to do with political
traditions .... It has to do with the perception that education is a local
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Recently, however, the inequities inherent in this system
have prompted several legal challenges. Beginning in the
late 1960s, education finance reformers in several states
started filing legal actions charging that traditional school fi-
nancing schemes, based predominantly on local property tax
revenue, violated federal and state constitutional guarantees
of equal protection.'1 They argued that states should em-
brace the principle of "fiscal neutrality," a maxim requiring
that the quality of a student's education operate independent
of wealth other than the state's overall wealth. 12 Equal pro-
tection, they contended, meant that states had to devote
equivalent resources to each student's education, regardless
of individual or community affluence.'
3
In 1973, just as the first wave of school finance litigation
was gathering steam, the United States Supreme Court held
in San Antonio v. Rodriguez'4 that traditional school financ-
ing schemes, based predominantly on local property tax reve-
nue, do not violate the Constitution, even when they produce
funding issue and that local school boards ought to be able to decide on
how much is being spent and then be able to tax their people to do that.
Jerry Gray, School Financing Seen as Push Toward More State Control, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1994, at A12.
There are some sound policy justifications for allowing local communities to
control funding for their public schools. By keeping the benefit of better local
schools closely tied to the burden of property taxation, the traditional financing
scheme maximizes the incentive of communities to tax themselves in order to
support public education. In other words, because the community retains all
benefits from the revenue, it will be more willing to accept the tax. See infra
text accompanying notes 222-232.
11. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District, 337 F. Supp. 280
(W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971) (Serrano I).
12. This principle was introduced in 1970 by the influential work of Profes-
sors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman. JOHN E. CooNs ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION 2 (1970). This work was a major catalyst in the birth of
school finance litigation in the United States. See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5,
at 600 (noting that Private Wealth and Public Education was "the moving force"
behind the Serrano and Rodriguez cases). Professors Coons, Clune and
Sugarman proposed the principle of fiscal neutrality as a policy alternative that
would decouple per pupil expenditures from school districts' relative property
wealth, and that might be acceptable to courts that would soon rule on chal-
lenges to school financing schemes. Id. at 600-01. "Fully implemented, the
proposition would achieve the result that equal tax rates produced equal yields.
It would not require that districts choose the same tax rates, however, thus
preserving local control over how much money was to be raised locally." Id. at
600.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 84-90.
14. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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sizable interdistrict funding disparities. The Court specifi-
cally held that wealth does not constitute a "suspect classifi-
cation" and that education was not a "fundamental right"
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 Because Rodriguez ef-
fectively closed the door on any federal constitutional chal-
lenge to school financing systems, 16 reformers have subse-
quently pressed their claims in state courts.17  And these
actions, based on state constitutional equal protection guar-
antees18 and education clauses, 19 have been remarkably
successful. By July of 1994, the highest courts of thirteen
states had struck down public school financing plans as
unconstitutional.20
15. Id. at 30-34.
16. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 343 (stating that Rodriguez "evis-
cerat[ed] a federal constitutional basis for school finance reform"); Christopher
F. Edley, Jr., Lawyers and Education Reform, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 293, 294-
95 (1991) (noting that, in Rodriguez, "the United States Supreme Court sig-
naled ... that the federal constitution does not provide the tool that advocates
need to challenge even radically unequal distribution of educational funding").
17. Reformers were essentially encouraged to bring such claims as a result
of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Rodriguez: "[o]f course, nothing in
the Court's decision today should inhibit further review of state educational
funding schemes under state constitutional provisions." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I); Hor-
ton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
19. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). These
claims can be further divided into equity claims and minimum standards
claims. See Molly McCusic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance
Reform Litigation, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991). The former are essen-
tially indistinguishable from equal protection clause claims, alleging that edu-
cational opportunity is distributed unequally and discriminatorily. Id. The lat-
ter assert that the state has failed to provide all of its students with a
minimally adequate education. Id.
20. See generally Harper v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); DuPree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241;
Horton, 376 A.2d 359; Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d
684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Tennessee
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood, 777
S.W.2d 391; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley
v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); see also Gray, supra note 10, at A12. In
addition, state trial courts in Missouri and North Dakota have recently held
their states' respective school financing schemes unconstitutional. Recent De-
velopments in School Finance Equity and Educational Adequacy Cases 6-10
(Sept. 1993) (Memorandum prepared by Hogan & Hartson) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Hogan Memorandum].
[Vol. 35768
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Although school finance litigation is intuitively appealing
to those who wish to expand the educational opportunities of
disadvantaged children, it is unclear how much reform un-
dertaken in response to litigation has actually benefited poor
students. Despite substantial empirical research on the sub-
ject, the link between educational expenditures and student
achievement remains tenuous, particularly for poor stu-
dents.21 However, all else being equal, greater resources
should improve the educational opportunities of disadvan-
taged students.22 But all things are obviously not equal, such
as socioeconomic status, the educational achievement of one's
parents, parental involvement and support, and the social
21. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUC. OPPORTUNITY (1966) (The Coleman Re-
port); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 7-8 (1972); Eric A. Hanushek, When School
Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 425-41
(1991) (reviewing the literature on expenditure-outcome relationship and con-
cluding "[there is no systemic relationship between school expenditures and
student performance") (emphasis omitted); Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of
Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1141, 1162 (1986).
22. In an influential recent study of effective schools, Professors Chubb and
Moe write:
It makes sense to think that schools ought to operate more successfully
the more resources they have to work with. Schools that offer higher
salaries and smaller classes-both of which require more financial re-
sources-should attract more talented teachers, who in turn should do
a better job of teaching. Similarly, schools with superior facilities,
equipment, and supplies-for example, bright, clean buildings and
classrooms, state-of-the-art laboratories and computers, current and
innovative instructional materials-should be more successful than
schools that are physically antiquated or dilapidated.
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 10, at 102; see also WILLIAM I. GARMS ET AL., SCHOOL
FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 22 (1978) ("All
other things being equal, it is hard to imagine that students from poorly funded
school districts with large classes, inadequately prepared teachers, and limited
course offerings have the same opportunity to learn as their more fortunate
counterparts in districts spending two or three times the state average.");
Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance
Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129, 131 (1991) (review-
ing the empirical research and concluding "few educators or commentators ar-
gue that educational expenditure is not at least a factor in academic achieve-
ment"); Edley, Jr., supra note 16, at 296 ("The mainstream, conventional
wisdom is justifiably unshaken by such skepticism [regarding the relationship
between educational spending and student achievement]: if we are interested in
better education results, higher per-pupil expenditures are neither necessary
nor sufficient in all cases, but money is very likely to help.").
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class of one's peers.23 Research appears to demonstrate that
increasing educational expenditures, if directed appropri-
ately, can overcome some of these preexisting barriers to stu-
dent achievement.24 Nonetheless, many studies indicate that
increasing a school's resources has little effect on educational
outcomes.25
23. Research indicates that each of these factors is influential in determin-
ing levels of student achievement. For instance, a recent study of school dis-
tricts in Washington state conducted by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer revealed a
strong correlation between student test scores and four independent factors:
median family income, percentage of children in poverty, percentage of parents
with college degrees, and percentage of mothers with no diplomas. Kathy
George, Parent Income, Education Levels Matter, SEATTLE POST-INTEL., Feb. 13,
1995, at A4.
24. See MICHAEL RUTTER ET AL., FIFTEEN THOUSAND HOURS: SECONDARY
SCHOOLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CHILDREN (1979) (showing that factors such as
class size and teacher experience are significant factors in determining educa-
tional outcomes); WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 55 (stating that expendi-
tures on direct instructional activities demonstrate a "positive relationship be-
tween student outcomes and moneys expended"); Carl M.S. Lee et al., An
Analysis of Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) Scores and
School District Revenues and Expenditures, 13 J. EDUC. FIN. 496 (1988) (show-
ing that per pupil expenditures are highly correlated with standardized test
scores); Bettye MacPhail-Wilcox & Richard A. King, Resource Allocation Stud-
ies: Implications for School Improvement and School Finance Research, 11 J.
EDUC. FIN. 416 (1986) (demonstrating that resource allocation within class-
rooms affects student achievement); Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith,
Effective Schools: A Review, 83 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 427-28 (1983) (contending
that nine organization-structure variables-school-site management, instruc-
tional leadership, staff stability, curriculum articulation and organization,
schoolwide staff development, parental involvement and support, schoolwide
recognition of academic success, maximized learning time, and district sup-
port-significantly affect student achievement); Anita A. Summers & Barbara
L. Wolfe, Do Schools Make a Difference?, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 639, 639 (1977)
(showing that in the Philadelphia School District "many school inputs do mat-
ter" and that "disadvantaged students can be helped by particular types of
inputs").
25. The author of a comprehensive review of the empirical research in this
area recently concluded: "[rlesearch has demonstrated conclusively that, within
the current organization and operation of schools, there is no consistent rela-
tionship between resources and student performance. Common policy argu-
ments, used to justify the plea for added resources to school districts, simply are
not supported by evidence." Hanushek, When School Finance "Reforms May
Not Be Good Policy, supra note 21, at 454; see also Frederick Mosteller & Daniel
P. Moynihan, A Pathbreaking Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY 3, 21 (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972) ("[S]chools
receive children who already differ widely in their levels of educational achieve-
ment. The schools thereafter do not close the gaps between students aggre-
gated into ethnicdracial groups. Things end up much as they began.").
At least two state courts have expressly refused to recognize a connection
between educational expenditures and achievement. In Lujan v. Colorado
State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982), the Supreme Court of Colorado
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Furthermore, finance reform aimed at equalizing ex-
penditures across school districts may actually disadvantage
a state's neediest students. Poor students and poor school
districts do not always coincide.26 Many needy students live
in urban areas that contain commercial and industrial real
estate, which augments a school district's tax revenues with-
out adding students. As a result, some districts with concen-
trations of disadvantaged students are "property wealthy"
relative to other districts in the state and spend more than
emphasized that "fundamental disagreement exists concerning the extent to
which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures
and the quality of education." Id. at 1018. And in Thompson v. Engelking, 537
P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, even assuming
that the Idaho constitution required equal educational opportunity, it could not
"adopt the ultimate conclusion advanced by respondents, i.e., that unless a sub-
stantially equal amount of funds are expended per pupil throughout the state
... students in those districts receiving less than the district with the greatest
expenditure per student are denied equal educational opportunities." Id. at
641-42. The uncertainty surrounding whether greater resources would improve
the educational outcomes of children in disadvantaged school districts clearly
influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. As Justice Powell wrote
in the Court's majority opinion, the plaintiffs' claims assumed "that the quality
of education varies directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that
therefore the difference in quality between two schools can be determined sim-
plistically by looking at the difference in per-pupil expenditures. This is a mat-
ter of considerable dispute among educators and commentators." San Antonio
Indep.. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56 (1973). But see Banks, supra
note 22, at 131 ("Most recent cases sustaining challenges to school financing
schemes recognize the correlation between spending and achievement and ad-
dress it in determining whether states are maintaining a sufficient level of edu-
cational opportunity.").
26. An empirical analysis of Connecticut school districts in 1970 revealed
that "the correlation between poverty families and... district wealth [was] not
significant." Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1327 (1972) [hereinafter
On Winning Battles]; see also Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May
Not Be Good Policy, supra note 21, at 444 (stating that "there is no clear rela-
tionship between district wealth and the concentration of student poverty");
Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
395, 398 (1991) (stating that" "wealthy' school districts often correspond less to
the presence of 'wealthy' residents than to industrial and commercial establish-
ments strengthening the local tax base"). Recent Minnesota school finance liti-
gation is a clear testament to this phenomenon. The plaintiffs in Skeen v. Min-
nesota, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993), were 52 suburban school districts that
contained mostly above average residential incomes and home values but below
average property values per student. See David Dormont, Separate and Une-
qual: School District Financing, 11 LAw & INEQ. 261, 278-79 n.129 (1992); Ho-
gan Memorandum, supra note 20, at 6. Significantly, none of the state's three
largest urban school districts-Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth-joined the
plaintiffs. Dormont, supra, at 278 n.129.
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average per pupil.27 Mandating fiscal neutrality can there-
fore take resources away from poor students.28  These criti-
cisms, among others, have raised doubts as to whether fi-
nance reform litigation has actually improved the
educational outcomes of disadvantaged students.
While the impact of school finance litigation on poor stu-
dents remains confounded with uncertainties, evaluating its
success in reducing funding disparities is still important.
First, the questions surrounding the effect of additional ex-
penditures on educational achievement do not justify states
continuing to maintain inequitable school financing systems.
27. The Connecticut study demonstrated a "significant positive correlation
between family poverty and business wealth. Thus, the 'poor' tend to live in
districts which are actually 'wealthier' in terms of commercial and industrial
property." On Winning Battles, supra note 26, at 1328; see also Hanushek,
When School Financing "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, supra note 21, at
444 ("Some states find that wealthier districts in terms of property wealth per
student also have concentrations of poorer families and children.").
28. As one commentator explained at the dawn of school finance litigation
in the early 1970's:
A high concentration of commercial or industrial property in a district
with many poor residents may skew the relationship between district
and individual wealth. Four combinations are obviously possible: (i)
districts where both property value and family income are high; (ii)
districts where both are low; (iii) districts where property value is high
but income is low; and (iv) districts where property value is low but
income is high. Individual wealth and district wealth do not correlate
in the last two situations. A policy shift in funds to low-wealth dis-
tricts, while rewarding those in situation (ii), will needlessly aid situa-
tion (iv) residents, and yet bypass the poor in situation (iii) districts.
Thus, a policy favoring low-wealth districts could shift resources to-
ward the "rich" and away from the "poor."
On Winning Battles, supra note 26, at 1308-09.
Indeed, William Clune, one of the co-authors of the principle of fiscal neu-
trality, now admits that the criticism of finance litigation that "poor students
might predominantly live in urban districts of above-average wealth and would
be harmed by a redistribution of state aid toward poorer districts" was "justi-
fied." William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez:
Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging
the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CoNN. L. REV. 721, 735 (1992). Clune
concedes:
[Miany districts with concentrations of poor students lose money under
fiscally neutral remedies. Disadvantaged students therefore do not get
what they need because there is often a redistribution of state aid from
wealthier urban districts and a lack of any special, constitutional sta-
tus for their needs in the turmoil of legislative planning.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Hanushek, When School Financing "Reform"
May Not Be Good Policy, supra note 21, at 444 ("It is likely that funds going to
many districts with concentrations of poor children actually will be reduced by
plans to neutralize expenditures on the basis of district wealth.").
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While the odds may be against poor school districts in their
efforts to substantially improve the educational outcomes of
their students, states should at least afford those districts the
opportunity to make a difference. Moreover, the empirical
question concerning the impact of additional educational ex-
penditures remains far from settled.29 Second, it would be
impossible to evaluate the impact of finance litigation unless
one first determines whether states have actually followed
through with meaningful reform. One cannot draw any intel-
ligible conclusions about the effects of school finance litiga-
tion unless one first knows whether litigation-prompted re-
form has actually achieved the more limited goal of reducing
interdistrict funding disparities.
This article offers an assessment of reform undertaken in
response to school finance litigation. Specifically, it presents
an empirical study of per pupil expenditures in five of the six
states in which the state's highest court held the school fi-
nancing scheme unconstitutional prior to 1984.30 The study
has two parts. The first examines whether litigation-
prompted reform has narrowed spending gaps between rich
and poor school districts.3 1 The second part evaluates the
rates of increase in educational funding in these five states
relative to the nation as a whole.32 By placing states' efforts
to equalize per pupil expenditures in the broader context of
overall educational spending patterns, this article explores
whether there is a relationship between equality and overall
funding for public schools. 33 It also examines how this rela-
tionship, if it exists, might have affected funding for poor
school districts.34
For proponents of school finance litigation, the results of
the study are mixed. The good news is that, over a period in
29. For instance, despite considerable research supporting the findings of
The Coleman Report, see supra notes 21 and 25, Professors Chubb and Moe
have concluded, based on a considerable amount of data, that "it appears that
resources may matter for school performance. When differences in expendi-
tures at the school level and the district level are averaged, schools in the top
quartile of student achievement gains spend about 20 percent more per pupil
than schools in the bottom quartile." CHUBB & MOE, supra note 9, at 102-03.
30. The study excluded New Jersey because comprehensive data on per pu-
pil expenditures by school district were unavailable for the relevant years.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 214-219.
32. See discussion infra part III.B.
33. See discussion infra part III.B.
34. See discussion infra part III.C.
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which interdistrict disparities remained unchanged in the
nation as a whole, 5 all five states narrowed spending gaps
between poor and affluent school districts. 6 This confirms
that school finance litigation has been at least moderately
successful in producing a more equal distribution of educa-
tional resources. The bad news is that in four of the five
states educational funding grew at a rate below the national
average.37 Moreover, there appears to be a rough negative
correlation between equalization and overall educational ex-
penditures such that, as a general matter, those states that
reduced interdistrict disparities the most increased educa-
tional funding the least.38 Finally, the study's revelation con-
cerning expenditures in California's poorest school districts is
just plain ugly: despite significant equalization between poor
and affluent districts, per pupil expenditures in California's
poorest districts grew more slowly than the national average,
suggesting that disadvantaged school districts might have
been better off under the pre-reform financing system.39
Part I offers a brief background of finance reform litiga-
tion, focusing on the landmark decisions of Rodriguez and
Serrano v. Priest.4 ° Part II discusses the decisions that
prompted reform in each state and presents the findings of
the study, examining each state's record in narrowing in-
terdistrict disparities and in increasing educational expendi-
tures. Finally, Part III discusses the study's possible implica-
tions for the future of school finance litigation. Although the
study confirms that litigation-prompted reform has reduced
funding inequalities, it also suggests that equalization may
have triggered countervailing forces that undermined the
states' financial commitments to public education. The
study's overarching conclusion is therefore somewhat pessi-
mistic, albeit predictable: in the context of tight budgetary
constraints and existing political priorities, fiscal equality
and quality public education may be practically incompatible.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 214-217.
36. See infra Table 3.A.
37. See infra Table 3.B.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 220-221.
39. See infra Table 3.E.
40. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I). See infra text accompanying
notes 41-108.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
Modem school finance litigation began in earnest in 1968
with the filing of lawsuits in Texas and California.41 Four-
teen years after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board
of Education,42 educational opportunities for many American
children, particularly racial minorities, remained largely un-
equal.43 Language in Brown seemed to indicate the Court
was establishing a constitutional right to equal educational
opportunity."1 In the opinion's most inspired passage, the
Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments. Compulsory school at-
tendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of ed-
ucation to our democratic society. It is required in the
41. Most commentators have mistakenly described Serrano as the first de-
cision holding that a school financing scheme that relies predominantly on
property taxes may violate that state's constitution. In fact, the first case to so
hold was handed down by the Indiana Supreme Court 117 years earlier in
Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557 (1854), overruled by Robinson v.
Schenck, 1 N.E. 698 (Ind. 1885). See Kirk J. Stark, Note, Rethinking Statewide
Taxation of Nonresidential Property for Public Schools, 102 YALE L.J. 805, 805
(1992).
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
43. Some of the inequality stemmed from the recalcitrance of many south-
ern school districts in dismantling their de jure segregated systems. See gener-
ally Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South
During the Decade after Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 92 (1994). As of 1964, only
2.3% of African American children in the South attended desegregated schools.
GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474 (1986). It was not until
1968 that the Supreme Court conclusively announced that the time for "all de-
liberate speed," the standard for implementation articulated in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), had run out. The Court held in Green
v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), that "the burden on a school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439.
44. See Briffaut, supra note 2, at 783 (stating Brown appeared to indicate
how far courts would go to "challang[e] long-standing, deeply-rooted and legis-
latively authorized social institutions in the name of equal access to educa-
tion"); Douglas McKiege, Inequality in Louisiana Public School Finance:
Should Educational Quality Depend on a Student's School District Residency?,
60 TUL. L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1986) (noting "[tihis language [in Brown] sug-
gest[edl that education is a fundamental right under the Federal Constitu-
tion"); David C. Thompson, School Finance and the Courts: A Reanalysis of Pro-
gress, 53 EDUC. L. REP. 945, 946 (West 1990) ("If the Court's apparent mandate
in Brown were to be satisfied, education, with all its dimensions and implica-
tions, would be placed among constitutionally protected rights, which would in
turn require that appropriate resources for equal opportunity be made equally
available.").
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performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.4 5
To most American children living in disadvantaged com-
munities, however, Brown's promising language turned out to
be more of a rhetorical flourish than a substantive guarantee
to equal educational opportunity. First, the remedies man-
dated by Brown, such as court-ordered integration, were
available only to combat racial segregation caused by inten-
tional discrimination.46 Thus, Brown's holding was of little
use to most students outside the southern and border states
where schools had been segregated by law.47 Second, Brown
said nothing about the pervasive segregation of students by
economic class, an inevitable byproduct of the combination of
neighborhood attendance zones and de facto residential seg-
45. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (remarking that
the existence of "both predominantly white and predominantly black schools in
a community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause"); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971) (emphasizing
courts may not act "where racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no
showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state authori-
ties"); GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw 710 (12th ed. 1991) (explaining
"purposeful discrimination is a necessary basis to demonstrate a constitutional
violation" under the Fourteenth Amendment); James S. Liebman, Implement-
ing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and
Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 354 (1990) (noting
that Brown and subsequent Supreme Court desegregation decisions have made
clear that "racial separation itself, even when coupled with vast disparities in
economic input and educational outcome, did not suffice" to make out a colora-
ble claim).
47. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (approving
a lower court's order that the Detroit School Board adopt remedial educational
programs to alleviate the effects of unlawful racial segregation in Detroit
schools); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (involving de
jure segregation of public schools in Pasadena, California); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding the public school system in Denver, Colo-
rado, was unlawfully segregated by race).
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regation by socioeconomic status.4 8 Against this background,
school finance litigation emerged as a modern, post-Jim Crow
analogue to the enforcement of the Supreme Court's holding
in Plessy v. Ferguson:49 if children from different socioeco-
nomic backgrounds (and races) were to attend separate
schools because of de facto residential segregation, those
schools should at least be equal.5 °
A. San Antonio, 1968
The Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez has received
significant commentary5 1 and hardly needs much rehashing
here. The central importance of that decision to the subse-
quent development of school finance litigation, however,
makes a brief review of its specific facts and holding useful.
The condition of San Antonio's public schools in 1968 is illus-
trative of the issues that school finance litigation has at-
tempted to address.
The San Antonio metropolitan area in 1968 comprised
seven school districts, 2 including the Alamo Heights In-
48. Cf Morgan, supra note 3, at 106-07 ("While the Brown Court recog-
nized the stigmatizing effects of legally sanctioned segregation, it made no men-
tion of the harm caused by providing inadequate educational opportunities for
people of color.").
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (adopting the principle that racially segregated
public accommodations do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment so long as
they are "equal").
50. Cf Rodney J. Blackman, Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 767, 791
(1992). Blackman provides that:
If Plessy, in theory, but not in fact, required tangible equality in a
state's funding of the separate black schools compared to the white
schools, then Rodriguez allows for inequality in fact, in a state's fund-
ing mechanism for impoverished (largely minority) school districts
compared with the wealthy (largely white) school districts.
Id.; see also Minow, supra note 26, at 395 (noting the debate concerning the
effect of educational expenditures is traceable to the NAACP's efforts to deseg-
regate schools in the 1930's and 1940's through the enforcement of Plessy); Mor-
gan, supra note 3, at 101 (contending efforts to desegregate and integrate pub-
lic schools have proven largely unsuccessful in equalizing educational
opportunities for African American children, and that litigation strategies
should now focus on "establishing a right to minimally adequate education").
51. E.g., Judith Areen & Leonard Ross, The Rodriguez Case: Judicial Over-
sight of School Finance, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 33 (1974); Developments in the Law:
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1455-
59 (1982); James & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 534-37, 551-55; David A. J. Rich-
ards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of
Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973); The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 57, 105-116 (1974).
52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11 (1973).
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dependent School District and the Edgewood Independent
School District. Alamo Heights is an affluent suburb that
rests in the hills overlooking the city,5" while Edgewood is a
Mexican-American community in the core-city section of San
Antonio.54 In 1968, Alamo Heights had six schools and ap-
proximately 5,000 students, eighty-one percent of whom were
white,55 and a median family income of $8,001.56 Edgewood's
twenty-five schools had an enrollment of 22,000 students,5 7
ninety-six percent of whom were either Hispanic or African
American, and a median family income of $4,68658 (see Table
L.A below). Almost twice as many Alamo Heights teachers as
Edgewood teachers were credentialed, and more than twice
as many had masters degrees.59 Most significantly, the as-
sessed property value per student in Alamo Heights was
more than ten times that in Edgewood, so that local taxes
produced $333 per pupil in Alamo Heights but only $26 per
student in Edgewood.6 ° Including all revenue sources, Alamo
Heights spent $594 per pupil compared to Edgewood's $356.61
TABLE L.A
STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF ALAMO HEIGHTS SCHOOL
DISTRICT AND EDGEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT, 1968.62
Alamo Heights Edgewood
Median income of students' families $8,001 $4,686
Percent of teachers with college degrees 100% 80%
Percent of teachers with teaching credentials 89% 50%
Percent of teachers with masters degrees 37% 15%
Student-teacher ratio 20.5 : 1 26.5: 1
Assessed property value per student $49,000 $5,960
Local property tax rate 0.85/$100 1.05/$100
Property tax revenue per student $333 $26
State foundation program aid per student $225 $222
Federal aid per student $36 $108
Per pupil expenditure (total) $594 $356
53. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT ... 322 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton
eds., 1993).
54. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12.
55. Id. at 12-13.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 11-12.
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On July 10, 1968, a 42-year-old sheet-metal worker
named Demetrio Rodriguez, along with six other parents
whose children attended Edgewood schools, filed a class ac-
tion in federal district court claiming that Texas's system of
financing its public schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 They alleged that
the existing scheme unlawfully discriminated against all
Texas children attending "property poor" school districts.6 4 A
study prepared by a plaintiff's expert prior to trial supported
their claim: of 110 Texas school districts surveyed, the ten
most affluent districts generated an average of $585 per pu-
pil in local tax revenue with a tax rate of $0.31 per $100 val-
uation while the four poorest districts in the study produced
only $60 per pupil with a tax rate of $0.70 per $100
valuation.65
A special three-judge federal district court panel declared
the existing scheme unconstitutional. 6 The court stated that
Texas's reliance on local property tax revenues to fund its
schools "assumes that the value of property within the vari-
ous districts will be sufficiently equal to sustain comparable
expenditures from one district to another."67 To the court,
the "adverse effects of this erroneous assumption ha[d] been
vividly demonstrated."68 The system discriminated on the
basis of wealth, which the panel treated as a constitutionally
suspect classification.6 9 The court also held that, "[b]ecause
of the grave significance of education both to the individual
and to our society," education was a "fundamental interest"
for purposes of equal protection analysis. 70 As a result, it
subjected the Texas system to strict scrutiny and found that
the state had not demonstrated a compelling interest for its
financing scheme. 71 It therefore ordered the Texas legisla-
ture to devise a new plan within two years that "does not
63. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 265 (1990).
64. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
65. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 75-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 282.
67. Id. at 281.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id.
70. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
71. Id. at 282.
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make the quality of education a function of wealth other than
the wealth of the state as a whole."72
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed.73 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell found
"neither the suspect-classification nor the fundamental-inter-
est analysis [of the district court] persuasive."74 The Court
noted that in each of the previous cases where it invalidated
laws discriminating on the basis on wealth, the plaintiffs
"were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and
as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."75 The
Edgewood parents, stated the Court, had met neither of these
conditions. First, the plaintiffs had "made no effort to demon-
strate that [the Texas school financing system] operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indi-
gent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath
any designated poverty level."76 Second, the Edgewood stu-
dents had not suffered "an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit" due to their lack of resources.7 7 Rather, the Texas
scheme, if anything, only resulted in unequal quality of edu-
cation, and "the Equal Protection Clause does not require ab-
solute equality or precisely equal advantages."78 The Court
therefore concluded that, in "the absence of any evidence that
the financing system discriminates against any definable cat-
egory of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute depri-
vation of education," the plaintiffs did not comprise a suspect
class for purposes of constitutional analysis.79
Despite the broad language in Brown concerning the im-
portance of education, the Court rejected the district court's
reasoning that education constituted a "fundamental inter-
72. Id. at 285. This is the principle of fiscal neutrality introduced by Profes-
sors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
73. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Id. at 18.
75. Id. at 20. The cases cited by the Court included Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956), where the Court struck down a state law that denied the provi-
sion of free trial transcripts to indigent criminal defendants, and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), where the Court established the right of indi-
gent defendants to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal.
76. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-23.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 25.
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est."80 The issue was not "the relative social significance of
education" but "whether there is a right to education explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.""' Finding
neither that the plaintiffs were a suspect class nor that edu-
cation was a fundamental interest, the Court subjected the
Texas scheme to the deferential "rational basis" test. 2 Be-
cause the system "rationally further[ed] a legitimate state
purpose," namely preserving local control over primary edu-
cation, the Court concluded that "the Texas plan abundantly
satisfied this standard."8 3 Despite the significant inequalities
between districts like Edgewood and Alamo Heights, Texas's
school financing scheme was nonetheless constitutional.
B. Serrano v. Priest and State School Finance Litigation
Simultaneous to the Texas litigation, a group of high
school parents and students from Los Angeles County initi-
ated a similar action in California.84 Like the Edgewood par-
ents, they claimed California's method of financing its public
schools violated the requirements of equal protection because
its reliance on local property tax revenue produced wide fund-
ing disparities between districts.8 5
California's school financing system was much like that
in Texas. In the 1968-69 school year, 55.7 percent of funding
for California's public schools came from local property tax
revenue.8 6 And because assessed property valuations per pu-
pil varied widely between districts, the system produced sub-
stantial interdistrict disparities in expenditures per stu-
dent.8 7  In the plaintiffs' own Los Angeles County, for
instance, Beverly Hills Unified School District spent $1,232
80. The Court quoted the precise language in Brown, see supra text accom-
panying note 45, that seemed to create a constitutional right to equal educa-
tional opportunity. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 29-
30 (1973). The Court nevertheless reasoned that "the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fun-
damental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 30.
81. Id. at 33-34.
82. Id. at 40.
83. Id. at 55.
84. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I).
85. Id. at 1244-45.
86. Id. at 1246 n.2. The balance was composed of 35.5% from the state,
6.1% from the federal government, and 2.7% from miscellaneous sources. Id.
87. Id. at 1247 ("Although equalization aid and supplemental aid temper
the disparities which result from vast variations in real property assessed valu-
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per pupil while Baldwin Park Unified School District spent
only $577.88 The inequalities in Alameda County near Oak-
land were even more stark: Newark Unified spent only $616
per student while nearby Emery Unified expended $2223 for
each child.89 Moreover, these disparities existed despite
higher tax rates in property poor districts. For example,
Newark Unified taxed local residents $5.65 per $100 assessed
valuation while Emery Unified taxed its residents only
$2.57.90
Unlike in Rodriguez, the plaintiffs in the California liti-
gation, Serrano v. Priest,91 initiated their action in state
court. Although the trial court first dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim,92 the Supreme Court of California re-
versed, holding that the financing scheme "invidiously dis-
criminate[d] against the poor because it ma[de] the quality of
a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors."93 Ruling eighteen months before the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, the court found both
that wealth was a suspect classification 94 and that education
ation, wide differentials remain in the revenue available to individual districts
and, consequently, in the level of educational expenditures.").
88. Id. at 1248.
89. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252 n.15 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I).
90. Id. The confluence of relatively high property tax rates and relatively
low per pupil expenditures often forces school districts in disadvantaged com-
munities into a truly unenviable position.
Districts rich in property may generate ample revenues with modest
tax rates, while property-poor districts may have to impose onerous tax
rates to generate even modest sums. This creates a "Catch-22" for the
property-poor districts with respect to economic development. When
deciding where to locate, companies often consider a community's
school system and its taxes. In poorer districts, the school system is
often not on a par with more affluent districts. Yet, raising the tax rate
to the level needed to improve the school[s] will itself discourage firms
from locating in the district. As a result, the property-rich districts get
the good schools, pay the low tax rates and attract the jobs that may be
needed more desperately in their less-developed neighboring districts.
A. Thomas Stubbs, Note, After Rodriguez: Recent Developments in School Fi-
nance Reform, 44 TAx LAW. 313, 315 (1990); see also Odden, supra note 5, at 3
("High-revenue-per-pupil districts usually are rich in property wealth per pupil
and levy below-average tax rates, while low-revenue-per-pupil districts usually
are poor in property wealth per pupil and levy above-average tax rates.").
91. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1244.
94. Id. at 1250 (stating "the United States Supreme Court has demon-
strated a marked antipathy toward legislative classifications which discrimi-
nate on the basis of certain 'suspect' personal characteristics," and that "[olne
[Vol. 35
1995] THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
was a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 It therefore stated
that the scheme must be subjected to strict scrutiny, meaning
the scheme must be "necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest."96 Because the trial court had dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims on summary judgment, the Serrano I court did
not reach a final judgment on the merits but instead re-
manded the case, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were 'le-
gally sufficient."97 Nevertheless, the court stated that if the
trial court were to sustain the plaintiffs' allegations on re-
mand, the "system must fall and the statutes comprising it
must be found unconstitutional."98
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Rodriguez just as the
trial proceedings in Serrano H were closing, essentially evis-
cerating plaintiffs' claims under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.9 9 The trial court nevertheless ruled that California's
school financing scheme violated California's state constitu-
tion.100 The Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding
that the state constitution's equal protection clause, although
"substantially the equivalent of the guarantees contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment," possessed "independent vital-
ity" that requires different analysis in some circumstances. 10 '
The court was buoyed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey's
decision thirteen months earlier in Robinson v. Cahill,
1 0 2
which held that, Rodriguez notwithstanding, New Jersey's
school financing scheme violated its state constitution.
1 0 3
factor which has repeatedly come under the close scrutiny of the high court is
wealth.").
95. Id. at 1258 ("We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless func-
tion of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a
'fundamental interest.' ").
96. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I).
97. Id. at 1266.
98. Id. at 1263.
99. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II) (ex-
plaining that the trial proceedings began on Dec. 26, 1972, and lasted more
than 60 days).
100. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 638.
101. Serrano H, 557 P.2d at 950.
102. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson I). The New Jersey Supreme Court
decided Robinson I on April 3, 1973, 13 days after the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down Rodriguez. Although trial proceedings in Serrano H ended in
March of 1973, the trial court did not issue its "Memorandum Opinion Re In-
tended Decision" until April 10, 1974. See Serrano H, 557 P.2d at 931.
103. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295.
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Similarly, the Serrano II court stated that Rodriguez did not
alter its judgment that "discrimination in educational oppor-
tunity on the basis of district wealth involves a suspect classi-
fication and [that] education is a fundamental interest" under
California's constitution. 10 4 The court therefore applied strict
scrutiny and concluded "without hesitation" that California's
financing scheme, "because it render[ed] the educational op-
portunity available to the students of this state a function of
the taxable wealth per ADA (Average Daily Attendance) of
the districts in which they live, ha[d] not been shown by the
state to be necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.1 °5
The Robinson and Serrano decisions inspired a flood of
school finance litigation in state courts across the country
premised on various state constitutional provisions. 106 Be-
tween 1972 and 1974, fifty-three suits were filed challenging
the constitutionality of thirty-eight states' financing schemes
under their state constitutions."17 By 1984, the supreme
courts of six states had invalidated their states' school financ-
ing schemes.108 How much have these decisions actually af-




The study examines per pupil expenditures in Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Washington, and Wyoming-five of
104. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II) ("T]he
fact that a majority of the United States Supreme Court have now chosen to
contract the area of active and critical analysis under the strict scrutiny test for
federal constitutional purposes can have no effect upon the existing construc-
tion and application afforded our own constitutional provisions.").
105. Id. at 953. Average Daily Attendance is simply the average number of
students attending school or with excused absences per day over the course of
the year. EDSOURCE, CALIFORNIA's K-12 SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 8 (1992).
106. See Thompson, supra note 44, at 953 ("The decisions in Serrano and
Robinson led to myriad state cases which were generally brought on the same
issues of fundamentality, equal opportunity, and equal protection.").
107. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 606.
108. Those states were Arkansas, DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); California, Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 929; Connecticut,
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); New Jersey, Robinson v. Cahill,
355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Washington, Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); and Wyoming, Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
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the six states in which the state supreme court invalidated
the public school funding system as unconstitutional prior to
1984.109 It compares expenditures per student in a base year
(usually the year of the state supreme court's decision)11 ° to
expenditures in the 1991-92 school year. To parcel out real
increases in educational funding from the effects of inflation,
figures from the base years are presented in January 1992
values. 1 '
The expenditure figures represent total educational ex-
penditures per student, including funding from local, state,
and federal sources. Importantly, the disparities in per pupil
expenditures revealed in the study do not necessarily reflect
unequal educational resources. Most states, as well as the
federal government, 112 supplement school districts' resources
with categorical funding for special programs. 113 For exam-
ple, California has more than fifty categorical funding pro-
grams that target needs such as special education, transpor-
tation, desegregation, and child care. 114  Thus, to some
extent, interdistrict disparities may reflect a disproportional
distribution of students with special needs, and true equality
109. New Jersey was the only state excluded. See supra note 30.
110. Due to the unavailability of particular data, the base year statistics for
California and Wyoming are not from the exact school year in which the state
supreme court decisions were handed down. Neither state's Department of Ed-
ucation could provide information from the exact years of the court decisions.
For California, the base year is the 1977-78 school year, one year after the
Supreme Court of California decided Serrano H. For Wyoming, the base year is
the 1977-78 school year, two years before the Supreme Court of Wyoming de-
cided Washakie County School District.
111. Dollar values were converted using the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U, Average of U.S. Cities), as computed by the U.S.
Department of Labor's Bureau of Statistics. The Bureau computes the CPI-U
on a monthly basis. The CPI-U is based on consumer prices in 44 U.S. cities.
112. School districts receive federal assistance through the Department of
Education pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (1992), originally enacted as the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The stated purpose of the
federal program is to address:
(1) the special educational needs of children of low-income families
and the impact of concentrations of low-income families on the ability
of local educational agencies to provide educational programs which
meet such needs, and .
(2) the special educational needs of children of migrant parents, of In-
dian children, and of handicapped, neglected, and delinquent children.
20 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp V. 1992).
113. For detailed descriptions of how states typically calculate the amount of
aid they distribute to each school district, see generally WOOD & THOMPSON,
supra note 2, at 19-45, and YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 592-94.
114. EDSoURCE, supra note 105, at 9-11.
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would likely entail some degree of nominal inequality in per
pupil expenditures. 115 But where the disparities between
poor and affluent school districts exceed 20 percent, as they
did in all five states studied, the inequalities probably reflect
more than just legitimate differences in district needs
targeted by categorical programs. 116
The study has two basic aims. The first is to determine
how much states have narrowed disparities between poor and
affluent school districts; it uses two measures of inequality
for this purpose. The first is percentile comparison, which
juxtaposes the average per pupil expenditure for schools in
opposite funding percentiles of the state. It compares the
wealthiest and poorest 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, and
20 percent of each state's school districts. 1 7 Percentile com-
parison analysis illustrates the disparities between school
districts at the poles of the expenditure spectrum.
The study's second measure of inequality is the Gini coef-
ficient. Developed in 1912 by Italian economist Corrado
115. See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL
RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 202-03 (1986) (stating
that "justice demands a pluralistic perspective on equality whereby equality for
all means different or more is equal for some"); WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note
2, at 95 (noting "equity may require deviations from absolute mathematical
equality so that fairness may be served with regard to children with special
needs"); Julie K Underwood & William K Sparkman, School Finance Litiga-
tion: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517-18 (1991) (argu-
ing that per pupil expenditures "ha[ve] proven to be an inadequate measure of
equity" because the "education that some children require to meet their needs is
more expensive than the education required by others," such as where the stu-
dent is "economically deprived, non-English speaking, or disabled").
116. Moreover, categorical programs nominally created to address the partic-
ular problems of districts may simply become a mechanism by which politically
powerful regions within a state are able to appropriate more funds to their
school districts. For instance, the Washington legislature created the "complex
needs" program in 1991 to help districts "deal with the cummulative impact of
problems such as poverty and multiple foreign languages." Kathy George,
Washington's Education Funding Formulas Flawed, SEATTLE POST-INTEL., Feb.
14, 1995, at Al, A6. But a computer analysis conducted by the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer showed that "complex needs" funding "goes mostly to big urban
districts that had comparatively low percentages of low-income, bilingual or dis-
abled children in 1993." Pd. Indeed, of the 17 districts annually receiving mon-
ies under the program, only three are among the lowest-scoring and poorest
districts in the state, and two of the 17 districts "have some of the State's most
affluent populations and highest test scores." Id.
117. The study compares the wealthiest and poorest 10 percent, 15 percent,
20 percent, and 25 percent in Wyoming because there were only 39 school dis-
tricts in Wyoming with 300 or more students in the 1977-78 school year, and
only 40 in the 1991-92 school year.
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Gini, 1 18 the Gini coefficient is a traditional measure of income
disparity that has been widely used by economists as a com-
prehensive measure of income inequality.1 19 Increasingly,
legal scholars have used the Gird coefficient in a variety of
contexts to measure a given regime's effect on distributional
equality.' 20 It has also been employed by litigants in at least
one school finance case to demonstrate interdistrict dispari-
ties.1 21 The Gini coefficient equals one half the relative mean
difference of income 22-in other words, one half the expected
difference between the incomes of two randomly selected indi-
viduals as a proportion of the average income.1 23 Its advan-
tage over percentile comparison analysis is that it measures
disparity over the entire range of data rather than at arbi-
trary intervals. For purposes of this study, the Gini coeffi-
cient represents one half the expected difference between the
per pupil expenditure figures of two randomly selected school
districts as a proportion of the state's average per pupil
expenditure. 1
24
118. CORRADO GINI, VARIABILITA E MUTABILITA 21-33 (1912).
119. See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY 53-56
(2d ed. 1983); AMARTYA K SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 29-31 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Rawls and the Principles of Welfare Law, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 184, 253-56 (1988) (using Gini coefficient to illustrate "chasm"
between the principles and institutions set out in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971), by demonstrating how a legislator would apply the principles to
reform welfare law); Donald S. Collat, Discrimination in the Coverage of Retire-
ment Plans, 90 YALE L.J. 817, 827-32 (1980) (proposing use of Gini coefficient as
measure of inequality to detect retirement plans that discriminate in the vest-
ing of coverage); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the In-
come Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 356-57 (1989) (using Gini coefficient to evalu-
ate the progressivity of medical deduction in personal income tax).
121. See James G. Ward, Remedies in School Finance Litigation, 36 EDUC. L.
REP. 1, 3 (West 1987) (noting a California appellate court sanctioned the use of
the Gini coefficient as a measure of equality in Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr.
584 (Ct. App. 1986) (Serrano III)).
122. Collat, supra note 120, at 827-32 (explaining derivation and function of
Gini coefficient).
123. Griffith, supra note 120, at 356.
124. The Gini coefficient can be expressed numerically as follows:
n n
G= 1 7 1 lYi-Yjl
2n2Ya i=1 j=1
where G represents the Gini coefficient, n represents the number of school dis-
tricts, Ya represents the average per pupil expenditure for the school districts
included in the survey, andy, and yj represent the per pupil expenditure figures
for each of the state's school districts. See SEN, supra note 119, at 31.
One can also demonstrate the Gini coefficient graphically. The x-axis is
the percentile of school districts by per pupil expenditure and the y-axis is the
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The second aim of the study is to examine whether judi-
cial mandates for greater equalization of per pupil expendi-
tures have influenced overall funding for public education.
For this purpose, the study uses figures for net current ex-
penditures per ADA compiled by the U.S. Department of Ed-
ucation125 and the Education Commission of the States.
126
By comparing real growth in educational expenditures in
each state to the U.S. average over the same periods, the
study explores whether there has been a negative correlation
between equalization of per pupil expenditures and overall fi-
nancial commitment to public education.
A few details about the data sample warrant explana-
tion. First, to avoid statistical distortions, the first part of the
study excludes school districts with less than five hundred
students.1 27 The data revealed that, all else equal, smaller
school districts spent significantly more per student than the
average district. This disparity can be attributed to econo-
mies of scale in administration and facilities achieved by
larger school districts. These economies dissipated at
roughly the level of 500 students. Moreover, the averages
presented in the percentile comparison analysis are an aver-
age of all a state's school districts, so that the inclusion of too
many small districts in the sample would have inaccurately
reflected the expenditures for the majority of a state's
students. 12 s
percentage of total school districts that are in the percentile. A 45 degree line
from the origin-the line of equality-represents perfect equality among
school districts, so that the area between the line of equality and the actual plot
(the Lorenz curve) reveals the degree of interdistrict disparities. The Gini coef-
ficient equals the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality di-
vided by the total area beneath the line of equality. See id.
125. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, HISTORICAL TRENDS:
STATE EDUCATION FACTS, 1969 TO 1989, 66-67 (1992).
126. EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, How MUCH ARE SCHOOLS
SPENDING?: A 50-STATE EXAMINATION OF EXPENDITURE PATTERNS OVER THE LAST
DECADE 22-23 (1993). The figures presented in this report were adjusted for
cost of living variances across states. Id. at 23. The study converted the figures
back into nominal dollars unadjusted for cost of living differences. See id.
127. The Wyoming study excludes school districts with less than 300, rather
than 500, students, largely because the data set would have been simply too
small had it included only school districts with 500 or more students.
128. In the 1990-91 school year, for instance, 33% of California school dis-
tricts had less than 500 students. EDSOURCE, supra note 105, at 3. These dis-
tricts, however, represent only 1.44% of the state's public school students
(69,672 of the state's total of 4,835,166 students). Id. Thus, their inclusion
would distort the study's averages.
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Second, due to the different statistical compilation prac-
tices of each state department of education, the study uses
slightly different measures of per pupil expenditures to
demonstrate interdistrict disparities. For instance, the rele-
vant unit for California is total expenditures per ADA, while
for Connecticut it is net current expenditures per average
daily membership (ADM), 129 and for Washington it is net ex-
penditures per pupil not including transportation. Although
similar, these units differ in important respects. In addition,
the cost of living varies widely from state to state.1 30 For
these reasons, the per pupil expenditure figures should not be
compared across states. Because the relevant units are con-
sistent within each state from the base year to the 1991-92
school year, however, comparisons within each state over
time, as well as comparisons of the rates of increase across
states, are statistically valid.
B. Findings
The following section briefly describes the court decision
and judicial mandate that prompted school finance reform in
each state and summarizes the results of the study.
1. Arkansas
131
In 1979, eleven Arkansas school districts filed a class ac-
tion suit against the state board of education claiming that
129. Connecticut law defines average daily membership as:
[Tihe number of all pupils of the local or regional board of education
enrolled in public schools at the expense of such board of education on
October first or full school day immediately preceding such date, pro-
vided the number so obtained shall be reduced by one one-hundred-
eightieth for each full school day by which the board of education fails
to maintain a school year of one hundred eighty days and shall be in-
creased by one one-hundred eightieth for each full school day by which
the board of education maintains a school year beyond one hundred
eighty days, and be increased by the aggregate days of membership of
all pupils of the town attending school at the expense of the town dur-
ing the summer session divided by one hundred eighty, except that if a
board of education has implemented scheduling of school sessions year-
round, the state board of education may adjust the number so that no
loss or gain in state aid occurs because of the type of scheduling used.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-261(a)(2) (West 1994).
130. See EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, supra note 126, at 47 (list-
ing cost of living adjustment factors for all 50 states in 1992).
131. The data for per pupil expenditures in Arkansas school districts comes
from ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT OF
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ARKANSAS (1985), for the 1983-84 school year and
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the state's public school financing scheme violated state con-
stitutional guarantees to equal protection and to a thorough
and efficient public education.1 3 2 The plaintiffs' basic charge
was the same as that alleged in Rodriguez and Serrano-that
the financing scheme relied too heavily on local property tax
revenue, causing significant interdistrict inequalities that
were not adequately ameliorated by the state foundation
program. 133
The Supreme Court of Arkansas found "undisputed evi-
dence" of "sharp disparities among school districts in the ex-
penditures per pupil and the education opportunities avail-
able as reflected by staff, class size, curriculum, remedial
services, facilities, materials and equipment."1 34 These dis-
parities, stated the court, were a direct result of the property
wealth of each district, and aid from the state did nothing to
mitigate these inequalities.1 35 Finding that the system "only
promote[d] greater opportunities for the advantaged while di-
minishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged," 136 the
court held that there was "no legitimate state purpose to sup-
port the system."13 7 Because property wealth was "what pri-
marily dictate[d] the amount of revenue each district re-
ceive[d] and the quality of education in that district,"1 38 the
financing scheme could not survive even a "rational basis"
test and therefore violated the Arkansas constitution.139 The
court commanded the legislature to devise a system that bore
a "rational relationship to the educational needs of the indi-
vidual districts," so that educational opportunities for Arkan-
sas's children were not "controlled by the fortuitous circum-
stance of residence.'
40
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ARKANSAS (1993) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT], for the 1991-92 school year.
132. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983).
133. Id. In the 1978-79 school year, 38.1% of funding for Arkansas' public
schools came from local revenues, 51.6% from the state, and 10.3% from the
federal government. Id.
134. Id. at 92.
135. Id. In fact, the court stated that the state program actually aggravated
absolute disparities between property poor and property rich school districts.
136. Id. at 93.
137. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983).
138. Id. at 95.
139. Id. at 93.
140. Id.
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a. Interdistrict Disparities
Percentile comparison analysis of school districts' cur-
rent expenses per ADA141 shows that Arkansas reduced in-
terdistrict disparities by between eleven and nineteen per-
cent. For example, between the 1983-84 and 1991-92 school
years, the disparity between the wealthiest and poorest 5 per-
cent of Arkansas' school districts decreased from 51.53 per-
cent to 45.68 percent, a reduction of 11.35 percent. Mean-
while, the disparity between the richest and poorest 20
percent of Arkansas' school districts fell by 18.25 percent.
TABLE 2.A
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN CURRENT EXPENSE PER ADA
IN ARKANSAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(500 OR MORE STUDENTS)
Reduction in
1983-84142 1991-92 Disparity
Wealthiest Five Percent $2,967 $3,852
Poorest Five Percent $1,958 $2,644
DISPARITY 51.53% 45.68% 11.35%
Wealthiest Ten Percent $2,808 $3,581
Poorest Ten Percent $1,986 $2,676
DISPARITY 41.39% 33.82% 18.29%
Wealthiest Fifteen Percent $2,699 $3,453
Poorest Fifteen Percent $2,011 $2,701
DISPARITY 34.21% 27.84% 18.62%
Wealthiest Twenty Percent $2,623 $3,372
Poorest Twenty Percent $2,031 $2,723
DISPARITY 29.15% 23.83% 18.25%
141. The Arkansas Department of Education defines average daily attend-
ance as the "total days of attendance divided by the number of days taught.
This number includes those who attend outside the district on a tuition agree-
ment between the respective districts." 1993 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT,
supra note 131, at 3. "Current Expense per ADA" is defined as "Itihe current
expense less the amount received from other districts divided by the resident
ADA." Id.
142. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. The Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for January 1984 was 305.2 (with 1967
dollars equaling 100). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NEWSLETrER (Feb. 1984). The CPI-U for
January 1992 was 413.8 (with 1967 dollars equaling 100). BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NEWSLETER
(Feb. 1992). The conversion factor from 1984 dollar values to 1992 dollar values
was therefore 413.8 over 305.2, or 1.3558322.
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The Gini coefficients from the 1983-84 and 1991-92
school years revealed a similar reduction in inequality. The
Gini coefficient for Arkansas school districts for 1983-84 was
0.05167,143 while in 1991-92 it was 0.04318.144 This repre-
sented a 16.3 percent reduction in inequality.
b. Increases in Per Pupil Expenditures
Educational funding as measured by current expendi-
tures per ADA between the 1983-84 and 1991-92 school
years increased at a rate below the national average. Cur-
rent expenditures per ADA in Arkansas school districts grew
in real dollars from $3,030 to $3,770, an increase of 24.42 per-
cent. Over the same period, the U.S. average for current ex-
penditures per ADA grew by 26.73 percent, from $4,302 to
$5,452.
2. California145
The history of the Serrano litigation has already been
discussed, 14 6 but some details concerning subsequent
changes to California's public school financing system war-
rant mention. On June 6, 1978, in the wake of the California
Supreme Court's holding in Serrano II, California voters ap-
143. The Gini calculation for Arkansas school districts for the 1983-84 school
year was based on the following figures:
Average current expense per ADA = $1,674
Total sum of differences between pairs = 7,056,484
Number of school districts = 202
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(202' x 1,674)) (7,056,484) = 0.051666384
144. The Gini calculation for Arkansas school districts for the 1991-92 school
year was based on the following figures:
Average current expense per ADA = $2,988
Total sum of differences between pairs = 10,842,072
Number of school districts = 205
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
1/(2(2052 x 2,988)) (10,842,072) = 0.043175979
145. The data for per pupil expenditures in California school districts comes
from CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 1977-78: FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF CALIFORNIA (1979)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1977-78], and CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER,
ANNUAL REPORT 1991-92: FIANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING SCHOOL
DIsTrICTS OF CALIFORNIA (1993).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 84-105.
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proved Proposition 13.147 The initiative, which is still in ef-
fect, contained six basic provisions: (1) all property taxes
were limited to 1 percent of 1975-76 assessed market value;
(2) annual increases in the valuation of property for purposes
of taxation were limited to 2 percent; (3) valuation of property
for purposes of taxation return to market value only when
property is sold or transferred; (4) local governments were
prohibited from passing new property taxes; (5) communities
could not impose special taxes unless approved by the voters
by a two-thirds majority; and (6) any change in the tax law by
the state legislature required a two-thirds majority. 148
Proposition 13 dramatically reduced the ability of local
governments in California to generate revenue through prop-
erty taxes and therefore had an immediate impact on school
finance. In the first year of its operation, California school
districts faced a $7 billion budget shortfall, forcing the state
government to partially bail them out.14 9 With Proposition
13 still in effect, funding schools through local property tax
revenue is now impossible for all but the wealthiest commu-
nities in California. As a result, California now relies heavily
on state funding sources, such as income and sales tax reve-
nues, to finance its public schools. In the 1991-92 school
year, 63.6 percent of funding for primary education came
from state revenue, comprised mostly of revenue from in-
come taxes, sales taxes, and the state lottery. 150
a. Interdistrict Disparities
The California Department of Education separates the
state's school districts into three groups for purposes of data
compilation: elementary, high school, and unified school dis-
tricts (containing both elementary and high schools). 151 Per-
147. Lawrence 0. Picus, Political Analysis for California Education (PACE)
Policy Brief. The Effects of State Control on School Finance in California, Jan.
1992, at 3.
148. Id.; see also YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 639.
149. Picus, supra note 147, at 3.
150. JAMES W. GUTHRIE ET AL., CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA
1991, 53 (1992). State general revenue comprised 61.30% of primary school
funding, while the lottery contributed 2.30%. Id.
151. Because there may be legitimate differences in the cost of providing ele-
mentary and high school educations, the study has kept these data groups sepa-
rate. Again, the fact that other states did not separate the information based
on the type of school districts does not affect the validity of the study's statisti-
cal analysis, because all comparisons are between similarly compiled data (e.g.,
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centile comparison analysis demonstrates that interdistrict
disparities for all three groups of school districts have de-
creased between 20 and 30 percent. The gap between the
wealthiest 10 percent and poorest 10 percent of California's
elementary school districts decreased from 72.39 percent to
55.33 percent, a reduction of 23.57 percent. And the disparity
between the richest and poorest 20 percent of its elementary
school districts fell by 31.57 percent, from 52.20 percent to
35.72 percent.
TABLE 2.B
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER
ADA 152 IN CALIFORNIA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(500 OR MORE STUDENTS)
Reduction
1977-78153 1991-92 in Disparity
Wealthiest five percent $5,243 $5,981
Poorest five percent $2,761 $3,352
DISPARITY 89.89% 78.43% 12.75%
Wealthiest ten percent $4,901 $5,317
Poorest ten percent $2,843 $3,423
DISPARITY 72.39% 55.33% 23.57%
Wealthiest fifteen percent $4,675 $5,006
Poorest fifteen percent $2,913 $3,466
DISPARITY 60.49% 44.43% 26.55%
Wealthiest twenty percent $4,525 $4,825
Poorest twenty percent $2,973 $3,555
DISPARITY 52.20% 35.72% 31.57%
California reduced disparities between high school dis-
tricts by a comparable amount. The disparity between the
richest and poorest 5 percent of high school districts fell from
107.33 percent to 80.72 percent, a reduction of 24.79 percent.
the study compares California unified districts in 1977-78 to California unified
districts in 1991-92).
152. California defines average daily attendance as "the attendance of pupils
in the schools of the districts within the indicated grade span." Annual Report
1977-78, supra note 145, at viii. Neither of California's statistical compilation
reports defines total current expenditures.
153. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. The CPI-U for
January 1978 was 187.2 (with 1967 dollars equaling 100). BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEx NEWSLETTER
(Feb. 1978). It was 413.8 for January 1992. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1992).
Thus, the conversion factor for 1978 dollars to 1992 dollars was 413.8 over
187.2, or 2.21047.
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The gap between the wealthiest 15 percent and the poorest
15 percent fell by 27.47 percent, from 67.13 percent to 48.69
percent.
TABLE 2.C
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN CURRENT EXPENDITURES
PER ADA IN CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(500 OR MORE STUDENTS)
Reduction
1977-78154 1991-92 in Disparity
Wealthiest five percent $6,788 $7,563
Poorest five percent $3,274 $4,185
DISPARITY 107.33% 80.72% 24.79%
Wealthiest ten percent $6,116 $6,826
Poorest ten percent $3,382 $4,248
DISPARITY 80.84% 60.69% 24.93%
Wealthiest fifteen percent $5,756 $6,410
Poorest fifteen percent $3,444 $4,311
DISPARITY 67.13% 48.69% 27.47%
Wealthiest twenty percent $5,508 $6,220
Poorest twenty percent $3,495 $4,355
DISPARITY 57.60% 42.82% 25.66%
California was not quite as successful in reducing the
disparities between the poorest and most affluent unified
school districts. The gap between the wealthiest and poorest
10 percent fell by 20.14 percent, from 78.99 percent to 63.08
percent. Similarly, the disparity between the wealthiest and
poorest 20 percent decreased from 59.06 percent to 44.16 per-
cent, a reduction of 25.23 percent.
154. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. See supra note 153.
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TABLE 2.D
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN CURRENT EXPENDITURES
PER ADA IN CALIFORNIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(500 OR MORE STUDENTS)
Reduction
1977-78155 1991-92 in Disparity
Wealthiest five percent $6,335 $6,742
Poorest five percent $3,108 $3,681
DISPARITY 103.83% 83.16% 19.91%
Wealthiest ten percent $5,665 $6,086
Poorest ten percent $3,165 $3,732
DISPARITY 78.99% 63.08% 20.14%
Wealthiest fifteen percent $5,290 $5,692
Poorest fifteen percent $3,207 $3,766
DISPARITY 64.95% 51.14% 21.26%
Wealthiest twenty percent $5,155 $5,468
Poorest twenty percent $3,241 $3,793
DISPARITY 59.06% 44.16% 25.23%
Gini coefficient analysis shows similar reductions of ine-
quality in all three groups of California school districts. The
Gini coefficient for California's elementary school districts fell
from 0.08320156 in the 1977-78 school year to 0.06664117 in
the 1991-92 school year, a reduction of 19.90 percent. The
Gini calculation for high school districts decreased by 20.27
percent, from 0.09312158 to 0.07425.159 Finally, the Gini cal-
155. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. See supra note 153.
156. The Gini calculation for California elementary school districts for the
1977-78 school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $1640.35
Total sum of differences between pairs = 22,797,725
Number of school districts = 289
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(289' x 1640.35)) (22,797,725) = 0.083201331
157. The Gini calculation for California elementary school districts for the
1991-92 school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $3,988.88
Total sum of differences between pairs = 53,426,080
Number of school districts = 317
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(3172 x 3988.88)) (53,426,080) = 0.066642928
158. The Gini calculation for California high school districts for the 1977-78
school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $1,933.14
Total sum of differences between pairs = 3,600,227
Number of school districts = 100
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(100' x 1,933.14)) (3,600,227) = 0.093118495
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culation for California's unified school districts dropped from
0.09412160 to 0.07556,161 a reduction of 19.72 percent.
b. Increases in Per Pupil Expenditures
The increase in per pupil expenditures in California
school districts lagged well behind the U.S. average between
Serrano 11 and the 1991-92 school year. The average in-
crease in current expenditures per ADA for all California
school districts grew in real dollars from $4,120 to $4,866 be-
tween the 1977-78 and 1991-92 school years. This repre-
sented an increase of 18.11 percent. Average current expend-
itures per ADA in the nation as a whole over the same period
increased by 35.29 percent, from $4,030 to $5,452.
3. Connecticut
1 62
The Connecticut case, Horton v. Meskill, 63 also involved
a challenge to the state's reliance on local property tax reve-
nue to fund its public schools. 164 Local revenues, comprised
almost entirely of property tax receipts, provided seventy per-
159. The Gini calculation for California high school districts for the 1991-92
school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $5,049.03
Total sum of differences between pairs = 5,938,659
Number of school districts = 89
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(892 x 5,049.03)) (5,938,659) = 0.07424551
160. The Gini calculation for California unified school districts for the 1977-
78 school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $1,771
Total sum of differences between pairs = 18,094,901
Number of school districts = 233
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
1/(2(233' x 1,771)) (18,094,901) = 0.094115687
161. The Gini calculation for California unified school districts for the 1991-
92 school year was based on the following figures:
Average current expenditure per ADA = $4,339
Total sum of differences between pairs = 46,392,279
Number of school districts = 266
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
1/(2(2662 x 4,339)) (46,329,279) = 0.075558889
162. Figures for per pupil expenditures in Connecticut school districts come
from BUREAU OF GRANTs SERVICES, NET CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL
(NCEP) AND NCEP RANK, FY1977-78 THROUGH FY1980-81 (1993), for the 1977-
78 school year, and STATE OF CONNECTICUT BOARD OF EDUCATION, CONNECTICUT
PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENDrruRES-1991-
9 2 (1993), for the 1991-92 school year.
163. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
164. Id. at 361.
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cent of the funding for public education in Connecticut. 165
This system "ensure[d] that, regardless of the educational
needs or wants of children, more educational dollars [would]
be allotted to children who live in property-rich towns than to
children who live in property-poor towns."1 66
Upholding the decision of the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut held that primary education was a fun-
damental right under the Connecticut constitution, 167 and
"pupils in the public schools are entitled to the equal enjoy-
ment of that right."168 Subjecting the financing scheme to
strict scrutiny, the court struck it down. 169 In the court's
words, a system that depends "primarily on a local property
tax base without regard to the disparity in financial ability of
the towns ... is not 'appropriate legislation' to implement the
requirement that the state provide a substantially equal edu-
cational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary
and secondary schools.' 70
The court clarified that the Connecticut constitution did
not mandate "absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages" in educational opportunity. 171 It also explained that
the decision did not "requir[e] total state financing [or] loss of
local administrative control over educational decisions,' 72
and that the local property tax could be "a viable means of
producing income for education.' 73 On balance, however,
the court was reluctant to delineate the specific parameters of
a constitutional financing scheme. It emphasized that the
primary role in such matters belonged to the legislature,
stating that "the fashioning of a constitutional system for fi-
nancing elementary and secondary education in the state is
not only the proper function of the legislative department but
its expressly mandated duty under the provisions of the con-
stitution of Connecticut."' 74 Nevertheless, the court's holding
clearly required that the new system rely less on local reve-
165. Id.
166. Id. at 367-68.
167. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977).
168. Id. at 374.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 374-75 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 376.
172. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 375 (Conn. 1977).
173. Id. at 376.
174. Id. at 375.
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nues and produce a more equal distribution of educational
resources.
a. Interdistrict Disparities
Percentile comparison analysis demonstrates that Con-
necticut reduced interdistrict disparities by approximately 35
percent between the 1977-78 and 1991-92 school years. In
1977-78, the wealthiest 5 percent of Connecticut's school dis-
tricts spent just over twice as much per student as the
poorest 5 percent. By 1991-92, the disparity had decreased to
66 percent, a reduction of 35 percent. Similarly, the discrep-
ancy between the richest and poorest 20 percent of Connecti-
cut's school districts decreased from 61 percent to 39 percent,
also a reduction of 35 percent.
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TABLE 2.E
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN NET CURRENT EXPENDITURES
PER ADM 17 5 IN CONNECTICUT SCHOOL DISTRICTS











































Gini coefficient analysis of interdistrict disparities
reveals a slightly less significant reduction of inequality
among Connecticut districts. For the 1977-78 school year,
the Gini coefficient was 0.09714,177 while for the 1991-92
175. For Connecticut's definition of average daily membership, see supra
note 129. Connecticut defines net current expenditures as:
[Tiotal current educational expenditures, less expenditures for (A)
pupil transportation; (B) capital expenditures for land, buildings,
equipment... and debt service... (C) adult education; (D) health and
welfare services for nonpublic school children; (E) all tuition received
on account of nonresident pupils; (F) food services directly attributable
to state and federal aid for child nutrition and to receipts derived from
the operation of such services; and (G) student activities directly at-
tributable to receipts derived from the operation of such services.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-261(a)(3) (West 1994).
176. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. The conversion factor
from January 1978 dollars to January 1992 dollars was 2.21047. See supra
note 153.
177. The Gini calculation for Connecticut school districts for the 1977-78
school year was based on the following figures:
Average net current expenditure per
ADM = $1,566
Total sum of differences between pairs = 6,486,124
Number of school districts = 146
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
1/(2(146 x 1,566)) (6,486,124) = 0.097144853
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school year it was 0.07010.178 This constituted a 27.84 per-
cent reduction in the Gini coefficient.
b. Increases in Per Pupil Expenditures
Unlike any of the other four states, per pupil expendi-
tures in Connecticut school districts grew at a rate that sub-
stantially outpaced the nation as a whole. From the 1977-78
to the 1991-92 school year, the average current expenditure
per ADA in Connecticut school districts grew in real terms
from $4,337 to $8,308, an increase of more than 91 percent.
Over the same time period, the national average for current
expenditures per ADA increased by only 35 percent.
4. Washington1
79
The constitutional flaw in Washington's school financing
scheme was not that it relied too heavily on local property tax
revenue but that it depended too much on special excess le-
vies. Although the state provided school districts with basic
funding, it required districts to fund the balance of their
budgets through special levies. In the 1975-76 school year,
excess levy revenue constituted more than 25 percent of the
operating budgets of Washington school districts.180 The
plaintiffs in Seattle School District No. 1 v. State8 ' therefore
sought declaratory judgment invalidating the system because
of its failure to provide a basic program of education as man-
dated by the state constitution. The plaintiffs had been par-
ticularly aggrieved by the system because, in 1975, two spe-
178. The Gini calculation for Connecticut school districts for the 1991-92
school year was based on the following figures:
Average net current expenditure per
ADM . $6,858.
Total sum of differences between pairs 19,387,481
Number of school districts = 142
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
1/(2(1422 x 6,858)) (19,387,481) = 0.070100443
179. The figures for per pupil expenditures in Washington school districts
come from WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, BULLETIN
No. 26-80, FINANCIAL SERVICES, COMPUTATION OF NET COSTS PER PUPIL IN
1978-79 FOR GENERAL FUND OPERATIONS OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS FROM DATA
SUBMITTED ON FoRM F-196, PART 111 (1980), and WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, BULLETIN No. 7-93, SCHOOL BUSINESS SERVICES
(SCHOOL DISTRICTS GENERAL FUND REPORTS AND THE COMBINED BALANCE SHEET
FOR ALL FUNDS-FISCAL YEAR ENDING AUGUST 31, 1992) (1993).
180. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 98 (Wash. 1978).
181. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
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cial excess levies had been rejected by Seattle voters. This
had left the district in financial chaos, forcing the state legis-
lature to extend emergency assistance so that the district
could meet its immediate obligations.
18 2
The Supreme Court of Washington held that article nine,
section one of the state constitution, which states that "[i]t is
the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders,"'83
was not merely a "preamble" but created a "judicially enforce-
able affirmative duty." 1 4 Specifically, it required the state to
provide a uniform system of public schools with regular and
dependable sources of funding.'8 5 Special excess levy reve-
nue was "neither dependable nor regular" because it was
"wholly dependent upon the whim of the electorate and is
then available only on a temporary basis.' 86 Because Wash-
ington's system relied on such an irregular source of funding
to discharge its "paramount duty" to provide primary and
secondary education, the financing scheme was
unconstitutional. 187
The Washington court charged the legislature to enact a
financing system that produced "fully sufficient funds for the
'general and uniform system of public schools.' "188 While re-
jecting the plaintiffs' request that it adopt specific guidelines
for the new system with respect to issues such as local con-
trol, staffing ratios and salaries, and specialized educational
programs, the court directed the legislature to define and give
"substantive content" to "a basic program of education." 189
This meant that the legislature had a constitutional obliga-
tion to "make ample provision for the 'basic education' of
[Washington's] resident children through a general and uni-
form system supported by dependable and regular tax
sources."
190
182. Id. at 98 n.15. In the 1975-76 school year, 40% of Washington students
attended districts that had suffered levy failures. Id. at 98.
183. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
184. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85-86.
185. Id. at 98.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 99.
188. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 97.
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a. Interdistrict Disparities
Percentile comparison analysis showed that Washington
roughly halved interdistrict disparities between the time of
the court's decision in Seattle School District No. 1 and the
1991-92 school year. In the 1978-79 school year, the dispar-
ity between the wealthiest and poorest 5 percent of Washing-
ton's school districts was 73.13 percent. For the 1991-92
school year, the disparity was 35.54 percent, a reduction of
51.40 percent. Similarly, the disparity between the richest
and poorest 20 percent of Washington's school districts de-
creased by 55.62 percent, from 45.31 percent to 20.11 percent.
TABLE 2.F
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN NET COST PER PUPIL
WITHOUT TRANSPORTATION 19 1 IN WASHINGTON SCHOOL
DISTRICTS (500 OR MORE STUDENTS)
Reduction
1978-79192 1991-92 in Disparity
Wealthiest five percent $3,802 $4,409
Poorest five percent $2,196 $3,253
DISPARITY 73.13% 35.54% 51.40%
Wealthiest ten percent $3,670 $4,294
Poorest ten percent $2,270 $3,349
DISPARITY 61.67% 28.22% 54.24%
Wealthiest fifteen percent $3,505 $4,206
Poorest fifteen percent $2,318 $3,408
DISPARITY 51.21% 23.42% 54.27%
Wealthiest twenty percent $3,438 $4,139
Poorest twenty percent $2,366 $3,446
DISPARITY 45.31% 20.11% 55.62%
Gini coefficient analysis demonstrated an almost identi-
cal reduction in interdistrict inequalities. The Gini coeffi-
cient for Washington school districts in the 1978-79 school
191. Neither Washington annual report provides a technical definition for
net cost per pupil without transportation, nor does a definition appear in
Washington's statutes.
192. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. The CPI-U for
January, 1979, was 204.7 (with 1967 dollars equaling 100). BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NEWSLETTER
(Feb. 1979). It was 413.8 for January 1992. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1992).
Thus, the conversion factor for 1979 dollars to 1992 dollars was 413.8 over
204.7, or 2.0214949.
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year was 0.07528.193 By the 1991-92 school year, the Gini
coefficient had decreased to 0.03691,194 a reduction of 50.96
percent.
b. Increases in Per Pupil Expenditures
The growth of per pupil expenditures in Washington
school districts lagged significantly behind the U.S. average.
The average current expenditure per ADA in Washington
school districts increased in real terms from $4,393 for the
1978-79 school year to $5,317 for the 1991-92 school year.
This represented an increase of 21.03 percent. Meanwhile,
current expenditures per ADA for the nation as a whole grew
by 33.53 percent during the same period, from $4,083 to
$5,452.
5. Wyoming'95
In 1978, several Wyoming school districts sought declar-
atory judgment that their school financing system violated
the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 196 In
the 1977-78 school year, more than 65 percent of school fund-
ing came from local and county sources, the majority of which
193. The Gini calculation for Washington school districts for the 1978-79
school year was based on the following figures:
Average net cost per pupil without
transportation - $1,431.87
Total sum of differences between pairs = 5,179,342
Number of school districts = 155
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(1552 x 1,431.87)) (5,179,342) = 0.075279647
194. The Gini calculation for Washington school districts for the 1991-92
school year was based on the following figures:
Average net cost per pupil without
transportation - $3,781.89
Total sum of differences between pairs = 7,509,490
Number of school districts = 164
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(1642 x 3,781.89)) (7,509,490) = 0.03691343
195. The per pupil expenditure figures for the 1977-78 school year in
Wyoming come from an appendix to the Supreme Court of Wyoming's decision
to overturn the financing scheme. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 338-39 (Wyo. 1980). The figures for the 1991-92
school year come from WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATISTICAL
REPORT SERVICES No. 3: 1991-92 WYOMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS FUND ACCOUNTrING
AND REPORTING (1993).
196. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d at 310.
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were property tax revenues. 197 Assessed property valuation
per pupil ranged from $10,899 to $209,543 among the dis-
tricts, creating sizable interdistrict disparities in total reve-
nues per ADM. 198 "ITihe property-richer school districts uni-
formly ha[d] more revenue per student than the property-
poorer ones." 199 As a result, the "quality of a child's educa-
tion in Wyoming, measured in terms of dollars available for
that purpose, was dependent upon the property tax resources
of his school district."
20 0
The Supreme Court of Wyoming found that education
was a fundamental interest under the Wyoming constitu-
tion 20 1 and that classifications based on wealth were constitu-
tionally suspect.20 2 Because the state failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest for the system, the court declared it un-
constitutional.20 3 A scheme that "allot[s] more educational
dollars to the children of one district than to those of another
merely because of the fortuitous presence of [valuable] prop-
erty... make[s] the quality of a child's education dependent
upon the location of private, commercial, industrial and min-
eral establishments," factors irrelevant to educational
needs.20 4 Where the state conditions the right to education
on a school district's property wealth, it "does not afford equal
protection."20 5
The court specified that its ruling did not invalidate any
particular statute. Rather, it declared that, taken as a whole,
"the entire system from organization of school districts
through tax bases and levies and distribution of foundation
funds" denied Wyoming students equal protection.20 6 More-
over, the court was reticent to outline precisely what charac-
197. Id. at 323. Local revenues comprised 42.6% of funding, while county
sources supplied 22.8%. Id.
198. Id. at 328.
199. Id. at 330.
200. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo.
1980)
201. Id. at 333 ("In light of the emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution
places on education, there is no room for any conclusion but that education for
the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental interest.").
202. Id. at 334.
203. See id. at 335.
204. Id.
205. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo.
1980).
206. Id. at 335.
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teristics the new system must contain.2 0 7 Clarifying that its
holding did not require "that each school district receive ex-
actly the same number of dollars per pupil as every other
school district," the court emphasized that "[tihe ultimate so-
lutions must be shaped by the legislature."20 8 The court's
mandate to the Wyoming legislature was to enact a financing
scheme consistent with the principle of fiscal neutrality:
"[W]hatever system is adopted.., it must not create a level of
spending which is a function of wealth other than the wealth
of the state as a whole."2 °9
a. Interdistrict Disparities
Percentile comparison analysis reveals that Wyoming
made relatively small strides toward narrowing interdistrict
funding inequalities. For example, for the 1977-78 school
year, revenue per ADM 210 for the richest 10 percent of Wyo-
ming's school districts exceeded that for the poorest 10 per-
cent by 103.28 percent. For the 1991-92 school year, the dis-
parity was 92.37 percent, a reduction of only 10.56 percent.
Similarly, the disparity between the richest and poorest 25
percent decreased by only 9.75 percent from 1977-78 to 1991-
92, from 74.63 percent to 67.35 percent.
207. See id. at 335-36. The court stated:
Everything from the abolition of local school districts and placing all
school administration on a statewide basis, to dividing the state into a
few multi-county districts, to making all mineral, commercial and in-
dustrial property in the state subject to a state tax for school purposes
have been suggested, but we make no recommendations in that regard.
Id. at 336.
208. Id. at 336.
209. Id.
210. Under Wyoming law, average daily membership "means the aggregate
number of pupils present plus the aggregate number of pupils absent, divided
by the actual number of days the school is in session for the year." Wyo. STAT.
§ 21-13-101(a)(i) (1994). Revenue is simply presented as the sum of all local,
county, state, and federal revenue. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 338-39 (Wyo. 1980).
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TABLE 2.G
INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN REVENUE PER ADM IN
WYOMING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (300 OR MORE STUDENTS)
1977-78211 1991-92 Reduction
in Disparity
Wealthiest ten percent $6,808 $9,078
Poorest ten percent $3,349 $4,719
DISPARITY 103.28% 92.37% 10.56%
Wealthiest fifteen percent $6,543 $8,651
Poorest fifteen percent $3,404 $4,719
DISPARITY 92.22% 83.32% 9.65%
Wealthiest twenty percent $6,373 $8,392
Poorest twenty percent $3,473 $4,777
DISPARITY 83.50% 75.68% 9.37%
Wealthiest twenty-five percent $6,161 $8,088
Poorest twenty-five percent $3,528 $4,833
DISPARITY 74.63% 67.35% 9.75%
Gini coefficient analysis demonstrates a greater reduc-
tion of inequality among Wyoming school districts. The Gini
coefficient for Wyoming districts in the 1977-78 school year
was 0.12011.212 By 1991-92, the Gini coefficient fell to
0.09779,213 a decrease of 18.58 percent.
b. Increases in Per Pupil Expenditures
As in Arkansas, California, and Washington, the growth
of per pupil expenditures for Wyoming school districts trailed
the national average. Between the 1977-78 and 1991-92
school years, current expenditures per ADA in Wyoming
school districts grew in real dollars from $4,321 to $5,355, an
211. These figures are in January 1992 dollar values. The conversion factor
from January 1978 dollars to January 1992 dollars was 2.21047. See supra
note 153.
212. The Gini calculation for Wyoming school districts for the 1977-78 school
year was based on the following figures:
Average revenue per ADM = $2,097
Total sum of difference between pairs = 766,176
Number of school districts = 39
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(39 - 2,097)) (766,176) = 0.120107715
213. The Gini calculation for Wyoming school districts for the 1991-92 school
year was based on the following figures:
Average revenue per ADM = $6,154
Total sum of differences between pairs = 1,925,962
Number of school districts = 40
The Gini coefficient therefore equaled:
11(2(401 x 6,154)) (1,925,962) = 0.097793162
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increase of 23.93 percent. The average increase for current
expenditures per ADA for all U.S. school districts was 35.29%
over the same period.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Good: Reduction of Interdistrict Disparities
The study's examination of interdistrict disparities
shows that school finance reform undertaken in response to
litigation has successfully narrowed spending gaps between
rich and poor school districts. Although their measure of
equalization varied, all five states included in the study re-
duced the inequalities between their affluent and poor school
districts (see Table 3.A below). This held true under either
percentile comparison or Gini coefficient analysis, indicating
that equalization was comprehensive: disparities decreased
between the poles of the expenditure spectrum as well as over
the entire range of school districts.
TABLE 3.A
REDUCTIONS OF INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES IN PER
PUPIL EXPENDITURES
Reduction of Reduction of Reduction of Reduction of
Disparity Disparity Disparity Disparity
Between Between Between Between
Wealthiest Wealthiest Wealthiest Wealthiest Reduction
and Poorest and Poorest and Poorest and Poorest in Gini
State 5 Percent 10 Percent 15 Percent 20 Percent Coefficient
Arkansas 11.35% 18.29% 18.62% 18.25% 16.43%
California
Elementary 12.75% 23.57% 26.55% 31.57% 19.90%
High School 24.79% 24.93% 27.47% 25.66% 20.27%
Unified 19.91% 20.14% 21.26% 25.23% 19.72%
Connecticut 35.03% 36.86% 36.00% 35.64% 27.84%
Washington 51.40% 54.24% 54.27% 55.62% 50.96%
Wyoming - 10.56% 9.65% 9.37% 18.58%
These findings are more impressive in light of recent re-
search demonstrating that interdistrict disparities in the na-
tion as a whole remained roughly constant during the 1980s.
A study by Professor Wycoff indicates that spending inequal-
ities between American school districts decreased only
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slightly from 1980 to 1987.214 Meanwhile, a study by Profes-
sors Schwartz and Markowitz showed that, from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s, disparities in per pupil expenditures
actually modestly increased.215 These results are corrobo-
rated by data showing that local revenue as a percentage of
non-federal funding for all U.S. public schools remained vir-
tually unchanged between the 1982-83 and 1991-92 school
years.2 16 Thus, as Professor Odden concluded, the available
information indicates that interdistrict inequalities for the
U.S. as a whole "did not change significantly" during this
period.217
Some of the studied states were more successful than
others in narrowing interdistrict disparities. For instance,
Washington roughly halved the disparities between its rich
and poor school districts, and Connecticut reduced inequali-
ties by nearly 35 percent. Meanwhile, Wyoming narrowed
the spending gaps from the 1977-78 school year by only 10 to
15 percent. Moreover, it should be noted that even in states
that substantially reduced inequalities, significant dispari-
ties in per pupil expenditures persisted. In California, for ex-
ample, the Trona Unified School District spent $9,618 per pu-
pil in 1991-92, while the Denair Unified School District
expended only $3,387 per student. In Washington, the per
pupil expenditure of Mercer Island School District was
$4,649 while Mabton School District spent only $3,036 per
student. And in Connecticut, Weston School District spent
$9,907 per student in 1991-92 while Columbia School District
spent only $5,223.
Despite these lingering inequalities, litigation-prompted
finance reform substantially reduced interdistrict disparities
in the five states as a whole, confirming school finance litiga-
tion's ability to effectuate a more equitable distribution of ed-
ucational resources. This finding dispels the fears articulated
by some commentators that school finance litigation has been
214. Odden, supra note 5, at 6 (citing J. Wycoff, The Intrastate Equality of
Public Elementary and Secondary Education Resources in the United States,
1980-87, ECON. EDUC. REV.).
215. Id. (citing M. SCHWARTZ & J. MosKowrrz, FISCAL EQUITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988)).
216. See EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, supra note 126, at 30-31
(showing local support constituted 48.6% of combined state and local support in
1982-83 and 48.5% in 1991-92).
217. Odden, supra note 5, at 6.
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plagued by a significant gap between right and remedy.218 To
the contrary, each decision prior to 1984 led directly to
greater equalization of educational funding among school dis-
tricts by the 1991-92 school year.2 1 9
B. The Bad: Rates of Increase for Per Pupil Expenditures
The findings from the second part of the study are more
discouraging. They reveal that in four of the five studied
states, educational spending grew at a slower pace than in
the nation as a whole in the years between the court decisions
and the 1991-92 school year (see Table 3.B below). Increases
in current expenditures per ADA in Arkansas, California,
Washington, and Wyoming all trailed the national average,
and the disparity was substantial in each of the states except
Arkansas. Funding for public schools in California, for exam-
ple, grew at only half the rate of the national average be-
tween the 1977-78 and 1991-92 school years. Of the five
states, only Connecticut exceeded the national average for
increasing current expenditures per ADA, although it did so
by a wide margin.
TABLE 3.B
RATES OF INCREASE IN CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER ADA
RELATIVE TO U.S. AVERAGE
Base Year National Average State Average
State of Study Increase Increase Difference
California 1977-78 35.29% 18.11% -17.18%
Washington 1978-79 33.53% 21.03% -12.50%
Wyoming 1977-78 35.29% 23.93% -11.36%
Arkansas 1983-84 26.73% 24.42% -2.31%
Connecticut 1977-78 35.29% 91.56% +56.27%
218. For instance, two commentators recently asserted: "The rise in litiga-
tion challenging school finance laws was a direct result of state legislators' un-
willingness to initiate reform without political pressure or court intervention.
Even with court intervention, the states have been slow to make changes."
James & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 561; see also Note, Unfulfilled Promises:
School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072, 1078
(1991) ("Even when school finance plaintiffs emerge victorious from court...
full constitutional redress is often more elusive.").
219. Whether reform has created as much equalization as reformers had
hoped is a separate issue.
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A majority of the states also slid in their national rank-
ings for current expenditures per ADA over the relevant time
periods. A year after the California Supreme Court decided
Serrano II, California ranked twenty-first nationally in fund-
ing for public primary education, spending $1,864 per stu-
dent annually. By the 1991-92 school year, California's place
had fallen to thirty-second in the nation. Similarly, Washing-
ton ranked seventeenth in 1979, spending $2,173 per stu-
dent. In 1991-92, it ranked thirty-first. Wyoming fell from
eighteenth in 1977-78 to twenty-first in 1991-92, while Ar-
kansas moved up just one place, from forty-fifth to forty-
fourth. Connecticut stands in sharp contrast; as the only
state to improve its ranking, it moved from seventeenth to
first in the nation.
The study also revealed that, with the exception of Con-
necticut, educational funding generally increased the least in
those states that reduced interdistrict disparities the most
(see Table 3.C below). For instance, in California, where
funding inequalities decreased by 30 to 35 percent, current
expenditures per ADA increased in real dollars by only 18.11
percent, 17.18 percent below the national average. In fact, in
three of the five states-California, Washington, and Wyo-
ming-the growth of educational funding trailed the national
average by more than 30 percent.
TABLE 3.C
REDUCTIONS OF INTERDISTRICT DISPARITIES AND RATES OF
INCREASE FOR CURRENT EXPENDITURES PER ADA, ORDERED
By REDUCTION OF DISPARITIES
Reduction in Reduction in Increase in
Disparity Disparity Current
Between Between Expenditures
Wealthiest Wealthiest Reduction Per ADA
and Poorest and Poorest in Gini Relative to
State Ten Percent Twenty Percent Coefficient U.S. Average
Washington 54.24% 55.62% 50.96% -12.50%
Connecticut 36.86% 35.64% 27.84% +56.27%
California -17.18%
Elementary 23.57% 31.57% 19.90%
High School 24.93% 25.66% 20.27%
Unified 20.14% 25.23% 19.72%
Arkansas 18.29% 18.25% 16.43% -2.31%
Wyoming 10.56% 9.37% 18.58% -11.36%
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The study also demonstrated that the level of equality for
the 1991-92 school year and recent growth in educational
funding may be correlated, although this relationship ap-
pears to be much weaker than that between equalization and
growth of educational spending (see Table 3.D below). Again,
with the exception of Connecticut, educational expenditures
generally expanded less in those states where funding was
most equal. For instance, in Washington, the state with the
lowest Gini coefficient for the 1991-92 school year (and there-
fore statistically the greatest level of equality across all
school districts), educational funding grew by 21.03 percent
in real dollars from 1978-79 to 1991-92. This compares to the
average increase of 33.53 percent over the same period in all
U.S. school districts. In California, the state with the third
lowest Gini coefficient for the 1991-92 school year, the real
growth of educational funding between the 1977-78 and 1991-
92 school years was only half that for the nation as a whole.
TABLE 3.D
LEVELS OF EQUALITY AND RATES OF INCREASE FOR CURRENT
EXPENDITURES PER ADA, ORDERED BY LEVEL OF EQUALITY
1991-92 1991-92 Current
Disparity Disparity Expenditures
Between Wealthiest Between Wealthiest 1991-92 Per ADA
and Poorest and Poorest Gini Relative to
State Ten Percent Twenty Percent Coefficient U.S. Average
Washington 28.22% 20.11% 0.03691 -12.50%
Arkansas 33.82% 23.83% 0.04318 -2.31%
California -17.18%
Elementary 55.33% 35.72% 0.06664
High School 60.69% 42.82% 0.07425
Unified 63.08% 44.16% 0.07556
Connecticut 52.47% 39.19% 0.07010 +56.27%
Wyoming 92.37% 75.68% 0.09779 -11.36%
These correlations suggest a relationship between equal-
ity and educational funding that could seriously undermine
the effectiveness of litigation-prompted school finance reform:
reform that assures a more equal distribution of educational
funding may trigger forces that pressure overall spending on
public education downward. That is, the reduction of in-
terdistrict disparities may be incompatible with maintaining
the same level of financial commitment to public educa-
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tion.22 ° Connecticut, which has both increased spending and
substantially reduced disparities, certainly illustrates that
these goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Neverthe-
less, four of the five states conform to the pattern, suggesting
there may be systemic, institutional forces that cause states
to spend less on education as they attempt to equalize fund-
ing. Given existing budgetary and political constraints,
states may be practically incapable of committing themselves
simultaneously to both equality and excellence in public
education.22 1
C. The Ugly: Funding for Disadvantaged School Districts
in California
The study's most troubling finding concerns the rather
paltry growth in per pupil expenditures in California's
poorest school districts. Despite gaining significant ground
on the state's wealthier districts, funding for California's
poorest school districts grew by only half the national average
in the years subsequent to Serrano. For instance, between
the 1977-78 and 1991-92 school years, per pupil expenditures
in the poorest 15 percent of California's unified school dis-
tricts grew by only 17.43 percent in real dollars, and spend-
ing in the poorest 15 percent of California's elementary school
districts increased by only 18.98 percent. During the same
period, spending per student in United States schools as a
whole increased by 35.29 percent. The same held true across
the entire range of poor school districts in California: for each
percentile group and for all three types of school districts,
220. This is not to say that poor school districts have been disadvantaged by
finance reform. Indeed, in every state except California, see infra Table 3.E,
the growth of per pupil expenditures in poor school districts exceeded the na-
tional average. But this does not answer the more nuanced question of whether
reform that requires greater equality-but which undermines a state's overall
financial commitment to public education-is in the long-term interests of
school districts in disadvantaged communities.
221. Cf SALOMONE, supra note 115, at 9-13 (contending that, in practice,
equality and excellence have been mutually exclusive goals in American public
education, but this division is a false dichotomy). Professor Salomone contends
"[tihe equality/quality debate actually has little merit" and "equality and qual-
ity are mutually supportive." Id. at 198-99. While this may be theoretically
true, equality and true excellence in public schools may be incompatible in the
context of current budgetary and political pressures. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 222-232.
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spending increased at a rate that significantly trailed the na-
tional average.
TABLE 3.E
GROWTH OF PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES IN POOR SCHOOL
DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA RELATIVE TO THE
NATIONAL AVERAGE
National Increase Increase in Increase in Increase in
Type of School Average in Poorest Poorest Poorest Poorest
Districts Increase 5 Percent 10 Percent 15 Percent 20 Percent
Elementary 35.29% 21.41% 20.40% 18.98% 19.58%
High School 35.29% 27.83% 25.61% 25.17% 24.61%
Unified 35.29% 18.44% 17.91% 17.43% 17.03%
These results demonstrate that, from the perspective of
poor school districts, the victory for reform in Serrano may
have been Pyrrhic. Assuming that, absent reform, per pupil
expenditures in California's poor school districts would have
increased at the same rate as the national average, those dis-
tricts would have actually spent significantly more per student
in the 1991-92 school year under the old property tax system.
In other words, while reform improved poor districts' stand-
ing relative to wealthy districts, it appears to have disadvan-
taged them in absolute terms. Of course, it is impossible to
know how much educational funding would have grown in
these districts had Serrano and school finance reform never
occurred; it may be that forces completely independent of
equalization undermined California's financial commitment
to public education. Nevertheless, these results call into
question a foundational premise of school finance litigation-
that litigation-prompted reform will necessarily bring greater
resources to a state's poorest school districts.
D. Plausible Explanations
The actual reasons for the lower rates of increase in edu-
cational spending in Arkansas, California, Washington, and
Wyoming are unclear and perhaps unknowable. It could be
that factors wholly unrelated to school finance reform-such
as recessions in these states' economies or broad political
pressure to alleviate tax burdens-have been principally re-
sponsible for the relative decline in these states' financial
commitment to public education. But there are at least three
plausible explanations for why equality (or equalization) and
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growth of overall school funding may be negatively corre-
lated. The most compelling explanation is that finance re-
form adopted to reduce interdistrict disparities decreases the
incentive for taxpayers in wealthy school districts to pay into
the public school system.222 Quite simply, a state can reduce
inequalities between school districts in only one of three
ways: (1) augmenting the resources of poor school districts,
(2) reducing the resources of affluent districts, or (3) imple-
menting some combination of the two. Given states' limited
fiscal capacities, the first option is likely a nonstarter; states
forced to reform their financing schemes almost certainly will
not have the resources to raise poor school districts' budgets
to a level commensurate with wealthy districts. As a practi-
cal matter, judicial mandates for greater equalization will
therefore force states to redistribute resources in some way
from affluent to poor districts.
As more local revenue is redistributed from wealthy to
poor districts, the incentive for affluent school districts to
maintain their pre-reform level of local taxation to support
public education declines.223 Consider, for example, finance
reform that redistributes 30 percent of local property tax rev-
enue from wealthy districts to poorer districts throughout the
state. Whereas prior to reform local schools retained all prop-
erty tax revenue in affluent communities, now only seventy
percent goes to local schools and the rest subsidizes poor dis-
tricts. Although residents of wealthy districts (particularly
those with school-age children) certainly retain an incentive
to continue contributing to the public school system through
local taxes, the "return" on their investment has been re-
222. See Stark, supra note 41, at 814 (stating a "worrisome possibility" for
redistributive school finance reform is that "support for public schools will di-
minish if the direct connection between local wealth and local schools is
severed").
223. See, e.g., Joe Ball, Efficient and Suitable Provision for the Texas School
Finance System: An Impossible Dream?, 46 SMU L. REV. 763, 799 (1992)
("Higher local taxes yielding less returns will discourage taxpayers from agree-
ing to increases in the already burdensome property tax."). The incentive dis-
cussed here is the direct personal benefit of better local schools. This applies
most forcefully to those residents who have school-age children. Of course, all
residents of a given state have a more diffuse interest in promoting an educated
citizenry. The author contends the former interest is more likely to influence
taxpayer preferences, so that measures that improve educational opportunities
for children in the state as a whole by taking resources from wealthy districts
will generally make residents of wealthy districts less inclined to favor taxation
that supports public education.
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duced by nearly a third.2 24 That is, the connection between
the burden of taxation and the benefit of better local schools
is more attenuated because only seventy percent of the reve-
nue is retained by the community.225 Affluent communities
will therefore be less responsive to the needs of public educa-
tion; they will no longer have as strong an influence on the
quality of their schools through funding and, consequently,
will have less incentive to maintain or increase pre-reform
levels of local taxation.226 And as tax revenue from wealthy
communities declines (or increases at a slower rate), the state
will have less total funding available for public schools.
This explanation applies with particular force to the fi-
nance reform experience in California. Two years after the
California Supreme Court decided Serrano 11, California vot-
ers approved Proposition 13, which dramatically reduced the
property tax burden on residents in affluent communities.2 27
As Professor Fischel noted, "Proposition 13 was a rational re-
sponse by voters who were faced with implementation of Ser-
rano."22' The judicial mandate for equality transformed local
property taxes from a means to ensure quality in public
schools into a "deadweight loss" for wealthy communities.22 9
Fischel continued:
224. This effect will be particularly strong if the new financing scheme dic-
tates that the amount retained by an affluent school district declines at the
margin. In other words, if wealthy districts are progressively "taxed" by the
new system, so that as they raise more local revenue they must contribute a
higher percentage to the rest of the state, this disincentive effect will be particu-
larly acute.
225. As one commentator explained:
[In the absence of a clear, local connection between burden (taxation)
and benefit (education), continued support for basic school funding
rests on a dubious foundation. Local taxpayers are likely to perceive
the social benefit of their own local public schools, but may be more
resistant to taxes which are funneled through the state capital to
schools in other corners of the state. Therefore, the crucial variable in
protecting local fiscal control is the local resident voter's perception as
to where her property tax revenues are being spent.
Stark, supra note 41, at 815.
226. Id. ("The theory behind local fiscal control is that communities will be
most responsive to educational needs if given the means to express their sup-
port of local schools through locally assessed property taxes.").
227. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
228. William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J.
465, 467 (1989); see also James & Hoffinan, supra note 4, at 571 (contending
Serrano's mandate of equality "so shocked citizens that it provided the catalyst
for Proposition 13 and other tax revolt measures").
229. Fischel, supra note 228, at 469.
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In the absence of the court's equalizing remedy, a vote for
Prop 13 would have been irrational for voters in more af-
fluent communities; they would have been eliminating a
system that provided net benefits to them, in that they got
good schools without having to pay, through increased
statewide taxation, for the schooling of people in poorer
areas. After Serrano, however, this argument no longer
applied .... As a result, a large constituency that might
have opposed Prop 13 was indifferent to or favored its
passage.
230
This hypothesis is corroborated by polling data indicating
that, out of all income levels, Californians in the highest
brackets voted in the strongest majority for Proposition 13.231
This is not to say financing schemes that redistribute
funds from wealthy to poor school districts will inevitably
lead to reduced overall funding for primary education.
23 2 It
may be that, up to a certain point, the effective "tax" for cross-
subsidization does not affect taxpayer incentives; it seems un-
likely that a redistribution of only 5 or 10 percent of local
property tax revenue would significantly affect the tax prefer-
ences of affluent communities. Or it may be that redistribu-
tive reform would actually increase the incentive for some af-
fluent communities to tax themselves because it would
require them to raise their tax rates to preserve pre-reform
funding levels in their schools. Moreover, there may be a
"tipping point" of equality-a level of equality up to which a
state can both reduce inequality and increase per pupil ex-
penditures, but beyond which taxpayers will no longer be
willing to subsidize other school districts. In any event, it
seems clear that the incentive for wealthy communities to
sustain pre-reform levels of local taxation to support public
education will generally decline as more of that revenue is
redistributed throughout the state.
230. Id. at 467; see also YUDOF ET AL., supra note 5, at 641 ("[Slince under
Serrano local voters could no longer 'buy' good local schools without supporting
public education in poorer communities, the voters may prefer a system in
which local property taxes are significantly reduced.").
231. Fischel, supra note 228, at 468.
232. Nor is it even clear that this is what actually happened in California.
As one author contends, the hypothesis that Serrano caused Proposition 13 "is
no doubt disputable." Stark, supra note 41, at 815. The same author admits,
however, that the argument that taxpayer incentives with respect to supporting
public schools are influenced by the connection between the benefit and the bur-
den is a forceful one. Id.; see also supra note 225.
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A second, related explanation for the negative correlation
between equality and educational funding concerns the avail-
ability of private schools. Wealthy parents can always opt
out of the public school system entirely by sending their chil-
dren to private schools. There are clear financial disincen-
tives to doing so; by choosing private schools, parents forego a
benefit they will still have to pay for in taxes, and they take
on the often significant burden of private school tuition.2 3
But assuming the family has sufficient resources, parents
will favor private schools if they believe the difference in
quality between private and public education is great enough
to justify the additional costs. Thus, as one would intuitively
conclude, the number of students who attend private schools
is sensitive to parents' perceptions of the quality of local pub-
lic schools.
Finance reform that redistributes resources from
wealthy to poor school districts is apt to create the perception
among many parents in wealthy communities that the qual-
ity of their public schools has declined. Indeed, if quality is
equated purely with per pupil expenditures, reform in three
of the five studied states appears to have adversely affected
the quality of education in affluent school districts. In Cali-
fornia, Washington, and Wyoming, the growth of per pupil
expenditures in affluent school districts substantially trailed
that in American school districts as a whole (see Table 3.F
below). This result is not surprising in light of limited state
resources. Because states have no choice but to implement
some measure of redistribution, wealthy districts will have
fewer resources under the new financing system than they
would have had under the old one. 2 34
233. See CHUBE & MOE, supra note 9, at 34 ("Because of the cost differential,
the perceived value of private schools must far outweigh that of public schools if
they are to win students.").
234. This does not mean that per pupil expenditures in affluent districts will
decrease, although they might. Rather, it means that expenditures in these
districts will increase more slowly than they would have absent reform.
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TABLE 3.F
RATES OF INCREASE IN PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
IN AFFLUENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS RELATIVE
TO THE U.S. AVERAGE
Increase in Increase in Increase in Increase in
Base U.S. Wealthiest Wealthiest Wealthiest Wealthiest
Year of Average Five Ten Fifteen Twenty
State Study Increase Percent Percent Percent Percent
California 1977-78 35.29%
Elementary 14.08% 8.49% 7.08% 6.63%
High School 11.42% 11.61% 11.36% 12.93%
Unified 6.42% 7.43% 7.60% 6.07%
Washington 1978-79 33.53% 15.97% 17.00% 20.00% 20.39%
Wyoming 1977-78 35.29% - 33.34% 32.22% 31.68%
If the perception that the quality of local public schools
has slipped becomes more widespread in affluent communi-
ties, more parents will send their children to private
schools.23 5 In the short term, this will increase funding per
student in the public school system: parents who send their
children to private schools will still pay taxes, but the total
revenue available for public education will be divided among
fewer students. In the long term, however, it may seriously
undermine a state's financial commitment to public educa-
tion. As more parents place their children in private schools,
fewer taxpayers-and, importantly, fewer wealthy taxpay-
ers-will have a personal stake in the public school system.
Once these parents are no longer directly concerned with the
quality of public schools, they will have a personal financial
incentive to see that equalization of per pupil expenditures
occurs at the lowest possible level. In their participation in
the political process, both at the local and state levels, these
parents will be less likely to support tax measures that fund
public education.
235. See Ball, supra note 223, at 786 (noting that, in response to a mandate
for equality, "communities and individuals may look for escape routes" such as
private schools). The flight of affluent parents' children from public to private
schools in response to judicial mandates for equal educational opportunity has a
strong precedent: in many southern communities, white parents removed their
children from the public school system in response to court-ordered desegrega-
tion, and they largely remain in private schools today. See Peter Applebome, In
Selma, Everything and Nothing Has Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994, at Al,
A12 (noting the schools in Selma, Alabama, "are generally still segregated, with
the old white public schools virtually all black and the whites-working class as
well as wealthy-in private academies").
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More broadly, as more children in a particular commu-
nity enroll in private schools, the community will be less in-
clined to tax itself at the same rate or to support statewide
taxation that finances public schools. And if affluent commu-
nities' taste for taxation to support public education declines,
funding for public schools will suffer.236 The result may be a
sort of downward spiral: as enrollment in private schools in-
creases, fewer taxpayers have an incentive to pay into the
public school system, which in turn reduces the resources for
public education and further encourages parents to send
their children to private schools.237
A third plausible explanation for the negative correlation
involves the removal of responsibility for funding primary ed-
ucation from the local to the state level. To narrow interdis-
trict disparities, the state government must assume a greater
role in financing primary education, both to redirect funds ob-
tained from affluent districts and to supplement the re-
sources of poor districts. 238 For instance, before Serrano, only
44 percent of California public school funding came from the
state government. By the 1991-92 school year, the state's
share had grown to 85 percent-64 percent derived directly
from state general revenues and 21 percent from property tax
revenue controlled by the state.239 Similarly, in response to
the decision in Seattle School District No. 1, Washington has
236. This effect is likely to be strongest in wealthy communities, where more
taxpayers will perceive that reform has reduced the quality of public schools,
and where more parents can afford private education for their children. The
loss of funds for primary education could therefore be significant, because a
small percentage drop in the property tax in affluent communities would mean
a substantial loss of property tax revenue to the state as a whole.
237. Cf Ball, supra note 223, at 786 (contending "concerned parents may
increasingly seek out private schools, pushing their legislators to increase fi-
nancial incentives for entering private schools at the expense of public school
funding").
238. See Faber, supra note 8, at 451-52 (stating recent court challenges to
school financing systems have led to less local control and greater state control
of public education); Odden, supra note 5, at 5 (noting the states' share of pri-
mary educational funding increased an average of 40% to 47% during the
1970s, and this "expanded role is not surprising since only the state can equal-
ize local education tax bases or school spending across districts").
239. Picus, supra note 147, at 1; see generally Henke, supra note 10, at 1(noting in the wake of Serrano and Proposition 13, school funding has become
"centralized," so that "[t]he state controls the revenue and decides how much
each district shall have").
820 [Vol. 35
8211995] THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
almost completely centralized funding for primary education
in the state government.2 4 °
The centralization of funding for public schools at the
state level can retard the growth of funding for public schools
in two ways. First, if primary education becomes one of many
items in a state budget, its funding will be more susceptible
to reduction through the state budget process. At the state
level, education must compete with several additional press-
ing social concerns, such as crime prevention, health care,
and various other state responsibilities.
241 This stands in
sharp contrast to public schools' place in a local government's
budget, where funding for public schools is the most promi-
nent of only a handful of budgetary obligations.
2 42 In addi-
tion, decisions concerning budget allocations and appropria-
tions tend not to be as political at the local level. School
boards and local governments are not subject to the massive
popular pressures or organized political action that influ-
ences state legislators. And these pressures, as they exist at
the state level, are likely to steer funding away from primary
education.
Second, states that centralize school funding at the state
level make funding for primary education more vulnerable to
fluctuations in the state economy.2
43 As the state assumes a
larger role in financing primary education, public schools will
rely less on property tax revenue-a means traditionally left
exclusively to local governments-and more on those means
traditionally available to state governments, such as income
and sales taxes.244 The revenues produced by these sources
vary more widely with the health of the state's economy than
240. Picus, supra note 147, at 4 (stating Washington "has virtually elimi-
nated the role of local school districts in school funding").
241. See Stubbs, supra note 90, at 341 (stating funding at the state level for
"education reform will have to compete with demands on the state treasury for
more prisons, better health benefits, higher pay for state employees and many
other programs").
242. For instance, in New Jersey, roughly 60% of local property tax revenue
goes toward funding public elementary and secondary schools. Iver Peterson,
New Jersey Shows Links in Tax Are Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at B1,
B5.
243. See EDSoURCE, supra note 105, at 17 (noting "[the dependence of edu-
cation on the state's budget is problematical" because of its reliance on "the
health of the state's economy").
244. This is precisely what has occurred in California, where state revenues
and lottery proceeds constituted 63.6% of school funding for the 1991-92 school
year. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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does property tax revenue because real estate values are
more stable than income or consumption.245 Thus, as the
state's responsibility for funding primary education in-
creases, the amount of revenue available to public schools
will become more sensitive to fluctuations in the state's
economy.
Whatever its causes, the relationship between equaliza-
tion and educational funding could be crucial to the future of
school finance litigation. If redistributive reform does in fact
trigger forces that retard educational spending, reformers
should attempt to anticipate the consequences of these forces,
both in deciding whether to pursue litigation and in design-
ing new financing schemes. It may be that these forces only
exist under certain circumstances that happened to prevail
in Arkansas, California, Washington, and Wyoming. Or it
may be that, through creative financing systems, their detri-
mental effects can be circumvented. It may even be that
these states' deflated rates of increase in educational spend-
ing were unrelated to equalization, although intuitively this
seems unlikely. Regardless, reformers aiming to improve the
educational opportunities of disadvantaged children should
earnestly confront the questions raised by these results.
Without careful advance consideration, victories in the name
of reform could bring more harm than good to those students
most in need.246
V. CONCLUSION
This study's analysis of per pupil expenditures in five
states that have implemented litigation-prompted reform
yields bittersweet results for proponents of school finance liti-
gation. All five states reduced funding disparities between
wealthy and poor school districts, demonstrating that litiga-
245. EDSOURCE, supra note 105, at 5.
246. Two authors who generally support school finance litigation have re-
cently been highly critical of legal actions initiated by overly "zealous"
reformers:
Oftentimes, these suits emerge largely based on anecdotal data and
simplistic statistical overviews. In fact, in several suits currently in
existence, plaintiffs' arguments are ill-conceived and poorly designed,
perhaps even based on faulty methodology. In these instances, if
plaintiffs prevail, greater inequities may emerge. In certain instances,
the relatively poorer districts would in fact be harmed by such judicial
actions.
WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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tion-prompted reform has produced a more equal distribution
of educational resources. But the study also reveals a troub-
ling relationship between equalization and educational ex-
penditures: in four of the five states, overall educational
spending increased at a rate below the national average.
This suggests it may be impracticable for states to commit
themselves financially both to equality and to excellence in
public education. Judicial mandates that require a reduction
in interdistrict disparities may set forces in motion that un-
dermine overall funding for public schools. In some cases,
such as California, these forces may so diminish a state's fi-
nancial commitment to public education that reform leaves
poor school districts with fewer resources than they would
have had under the old financing scheme.
This study does not show that this response is inevitable.
The experience of Connecticut clearly demonstrates that
states can reduce inequalities while increasing educational
funding at a rate well above the national average. Nor does
the study necessarily demonstrate a causal relationship be-
tween litigation-prompted reform and education spending. It
may be that forces unrelated to school finance reform have
undermined these states' commitment to funding public edu-
cation. Nevertheless, four of the five states conformed to the
negative correlation. These results, combined with the credi-
bility of the plausible explanations for the relationship,
should give reformers reason to carefully reexamine whether
school finance litigation is truly an efficacious means to ex-
panding educational opportunities.
In his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez, Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote that the Court's decision was "a retreat from
our historic commitment to equality of educational opportu-
nity and [an] unsupportable acquiescence in a system which
deprives children in their earliest years of the chance to reach
their full potential as citizens."247 Twenty years later, few
would dispute the assertion that America's public schools are
shortchanging their disadvantaged and minority students.
24 8
247. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973).
248. For vivid descriptions of the inequality of educational opportunity for
students attending inner-city schools with predominantly minority student bod-
ies, see generally ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY
OF Two Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991), and KoZOL, supra
note 1.
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Nor would many deny the importance of education in provid-
ing each child "an equal start in life."249 But the unfortunate
and even brutally unfair condition of public education in dis-
advantaged communities does not necessarily validate the
wisdom of pursuing school finance reform in the courts. Poor
children clearly deserve better educational opportunities
than states currently afford them, but whether school finance
litigation is an effective or efficient means to create such op-
portunities remains an open question.
249. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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